CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.591
16 May 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 May 1991, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Serguei B. Batsanov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

GE.91-60844/3190B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): First of all, I should like to welcome you to the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament following the break, and to declare open the 591st meeting of our Conference.

On behalf of the Conference I would like to wish a warm welcome to two distinguished visitors who are to address us today. The first to speak will be the Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, His Excellency Helmut Schäfer. This is also the first visit to our Conference by such a high-level representative of Germany since the important events that occurred last year in Europe, leading to a substantial improvement in the political climate and in security conditions. Bearing in mind the important role played by the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of disarmament and international security, I am sure that his visit comes at a good time, and that the statement he is to make to use today will be listened to with special interest by all of us and will make a meaningful contribution to our work.

We are also to be addressed by the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, a figure known to the members of the Conference. He follows the progress of our work very closely, and has come here more than once in the past to present his Government's views and concrete initiatives on key disarmament issues. Finland's contribution to our work, especially in the area of the chemical weapons ban, is greatly appreciated, and today I keenly await his statement.

I am sure that all of us regret the departure of two of our colleagues who have left us to take up important tasks assigned to them by their Governments - the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Wisber Loeis, and the representative of Myanmar, Ambassador U Aung Thant. During their time in the Conference they discharged their duties with professional competence and displayed their well-known distinguished qualities. On behalf of the Conference I wish them every success in their new assignments. At the same time I would like to warmly welcome the new representative of Myanmar, Ambassador Tin Kyaw Hlaing, who has been appointed head of his country's delegation.

The beginning of the second part of the Conference's session coincides with events which offer good omens for success in our work, particularly in the field of chemical weapons. I am sure that today we will hear more detailed statements concerning these events. I should like to take this opportunity to assure you that my delegation, and I personally as President of the Conference, stand ready to cooperate so that everything possible is done to advance our work on this matter, and also on other matters before the Conference, in order to resolve them successfully.

On my list of speakers for today I have His Excellency the Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, and also the distinguished heads of the delegations of the United States of America and Sweden. I now give the floor to the first speaker, the Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, His Excellency Mr. Helmut Schäfer.

Mr. SCHAFER (Germany): It is a great honour and privilege for me today to be able to address the Gene a Conference on Disarmament, the body which deals with central aspects of arms control and disarmament on behalf of the international community. You, Mr. President, have this year become Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for negotiations on chemical weapons. Your responsible task is looked at by people throughout the world with the greatest interest and high hopes: the earliest possible, universal, comprehensive and effectively verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany has strongly supported this goal from the very start and hopes that it will soon be attained. My Government, therefore, very much welcomes and fully supports the new proposals of President Bush which will be presented here this morning, as far as I would told, which aim at achieving the comprehensive and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons within the next 12 months.

In my statement I would like to focus on a problem which has acquired new relevance against the dramatic background of the recent Gulf war. I am referring to the dangerous consequences that the uncontrolled accumulation of conventional weapons and dual-use goods may have for regional and international security. The recent aggression in the Gulf area has once more made clear how important it is for the international community to increase its attention towards this subject.

Regional arms control measures remain central elements of international stability. The German Government therefore regards the early entry into force of the CFE Treaty as a top political priority. It is now essential to remove all obstacles impeding swift ratification of the Treaty by all participating countries. Only after ratification of the Treaty will it be possible to reduce the arsenals in East and West by substantial amounts of conventional major weapon systems. Most important is the manner in which this reduction is to be carried out. The CFE Treaty precisely specifies the procedures for destroying the weapons stocks in excess of the maximum amounts permitted. This ensures that increased security in Europe is not attained at the expense of security and stability in other regions of the world.

We in Europe cannot offer our activities concerning confidence- and security-building and disarmament as an example for other regions of the world if we are not ourselves capable of solving our problems.

Strict control of all arms exports has long been a firm part of the policy pursued by my Government. Every application for an export licence is very carefully examined by the German Government. Exports of war weapons to countries outside the North Atlantic Alliance are subject to particularly restrictive control. The German Government does not basically question spending on defence and arms exports. Every country is entitled to protect itself and the freedom of its citizens against external threats. This corresponds to the right of individual and collective self-defence as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. However, the German Government authorizes exports of military equipment only if it is adequately guaranteed that they meet legitimate security needs of the recipient country and do not increase existing tensions. In the fight against unauthorized and illegal

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exports, the Federal Republic of Germany tightened its export regulations and control mechanisms at the end of 1990 to such an extent that it now possesses one of the world's most restrictive export control systems.

But the developments of recent years make it clear that national efforts to control arms exports can have only a limited effect, which is likely to decrease further in future: due to huge development costs, new weapon systems are increasingly introduced by means of cooperative projects. This inevitably means that decisions on the export of these systems to third countries require agreement among all the countries participating in the cooperative project. The single European market due to be completed in the near future will thus make it indispensable to achieve greater coordination of national arms export policies. Talks between the members of the European Community have been started on this subject. The German Government hopes that they will soon lead to concrete results.

Our experience as a whole indicates that the global transfer of conventional weapons can be controlled only if all members of the international community collaborate. Export restrictions by only a few weapons-exporting countries cannot prevent the demand from being met by other countries. Moreover, countries that exercise restraint in respect of arms imports may become threatened by neighbouring nations that import a large amount of weapons. The basic requirement for tangible progress in limiting the proliferation of conventional weapons is therefore a general conviction that a solution to the problem is in the interest of all countries. In his recent address to the European Parliament at Strasbourg, United Nations Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar also demanded that particular attention be paid to the subject of arms export control in future.

Figures contained in a recently published UNDP study illustrate the dimensions of the problem: arms imports of developing countries increased from $1 billion in 1960 to $35 billion in 1987. This is about three quarters of all arms transactions worldwide. According to World Bank estimates, the third world's overall military spending amounts to almost $200 billion and is rising further. Even if the current growth rates were merely reduced, considerable funds would become available for economic and social advancement. The German Government is at present considering making its development aid, too, contingent on the readiness of third world countries to restrict arms imports.

The purchase of modern weapon systems consequently means high expenditure on maintenance, ammunition and spare parts. The end of the cold war and the change in East-West relations also exposed totalitarian régimes worldwide as blatantly inhumane, misguided investors: democracy and pluralism as well as economic and social progress cannot be replaced or even suppressed by the accumulation of weapons. And the figures I mentioned before indicate that the accumulation of conventional weapons is a problem concerning not just a limited number of countries, but all nations. Progress cannot be made if arms control in this field is regarded as action by a group of countries, such as arms exporters, against another group, such as arms importers, or by one region of the world against another. Dependence on armaments involves major risks for arms exporters and importers alike. In the case of

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arms-importing countries, the procurement of military equipment absorbs substantial funds that are then no longer available for economic and social development; moreover, the purchase of modern weapon systems consequently means high expenditure on maintenance, ammunition and spare parts, as I have just said.

Arms-exporting countries, too, must draw the necessary conclusions. For them there may be grave problems and a serious clash between the aim of safeguarding jobs at home through arms exports and that of fostering international stability through the limitation of arms exports. The claim that exports of arms, especially major weapon systems, help to preserve jobs is unfounded. Moreover, the military industry itself has recognized that voluntary and agreed conversion and destruction of military goods require jobs, which makes it easier to shed the jobs dependent on arms exports. Finally, the Gulf war showed arms-exporting countries that they may become threatened by their own arms exports to other regions. Both supplier and recipient countries must therefore consider it beneficial to limit the proliferation of conventional weapons. However, in view of the large number of manufacturers and types of conventional weapons, it is obvious that such limitations cannot be imposed. They must instead be achieved through voluntary self-restraint by both suppliers and recipients of conventional weapons.

A lasting solution to these problems requires more than merely restricting the transfer of weapons. It is also necessary to reflect on the verifiable limitation of production on a voluntary basis to begin with. Moreover, it appears expedient to seek ways and means of destroying excess conventional weapons under international supervision so that they do not impair stability in other regions of the world. The provisions of the CFE Treaty that I mentioned just now might serve as a model for more extensive arrangements on a global scale.

The German Government is of the opinion that the confidence- and security-building measures recently agreed in Europe are not sufficient to guarantee better prevention of future threats to stability in all regions of the world. As a first step towards limiting the proliferation of conventional weapons and dual-use goods, measures should be taken to promote transparency as regards the transfer of these systems. Foreign Minister Genscher demanded over 10 years ago the establishment of a United Nations register for arms exports and imports as an appropriate means of attaining greater transparency in respect of the transfer of conventional weapons. At their Luxembourg meeting last month, the heads of State or Government of the European Community supported the idea of setting up such a register. The German Government advocates that this United Nations register be introduced as soon as possible. We consider it essential for the register to be of such a nature that as many countries as possible decide in favour of communicating data on their arms exports and imports to the United Nations. A register which places very extensive demands on the data to be communicated but in which thus only a few countries are willing to participate is scarcely capable of making a decisive contribution towards greater transparency. The German Government welcomes the work done in this field by a United Nations group of experts, and awaits with interest the group's report and the recommendations in it. To my mind, such a register on arms exports and imports kept by the United Nations

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can be a significant step, but only an initial one that is to be followed by others - not least so that illegal arms transactions are outlawed further at the international level.

Limiting the proliferation of conventional weapons is an urgent problem whose significance in relation to nuclear, biological or chemical arms control - the theme of this Conference - should not be underrated. As is well known, the renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons has always, and from the very beginning, been a corner-stone of the policies of the Federal Republic of Germany; the German Government reaffirmed this renunciation on behalf of Germany as a whole at the fourth conference to review the non-proliferation Treaty. Germany is also participating actively in the current multilateral efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation régime. Above all it has advocated that full-scope safeguards be agreed as the pre-condition for nuclear supplies to non-NPT countries. To be credible, the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction and the commitment to their non-proliferation must also include missile technology. Particularly in this respect, the experience of the Gulf war has sent dramatic signals. The German Government therefore supports the ongoing efforts to enhance and supplement the régime. The reforms agreed or envisaged are intended to ensure that in future the missile technology control régime supplements to a greater extent the global non-proliferation régime.

We all hope that, following the disturbing experience of the Gulf war, there are now more promising prospects: we, too, are committed to the objectives set out in Security Council resolution 687 and are participating actively in their implementation. The elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and missle systems can serve as a prelude to more security and stability in the whole region. If this mandatory first step is followed by further voluntary steps on the part of all countries in the region, there is a better prospect of stability and peace in the Middle East.

Allow me to sum up: we know that weapons are not the cause but the consequence of tensions between countries. However, eliminating the threat potential emanating from these weapons can lay the groundwork for a process of negotiation in the regions concerned that leads to greater mutual understanding. This is also a major prerequisite for limiting arms exports and for demilitarizing international relations.

In these processes aimed at safeguarding peace, great significance will continue to be attached to the work of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. I should like to express my great hope, Mr. Chairman and Mr. President, that you will be successful within the next year in finally coming to an agreement which will allow us to do away with one very important and dangerous sort of weapon which we have been discussing here for such a long time, but I do hope now with even more success.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany for his important statement, for his warm words addressed to myself and for his best wishes to me as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I now give the floor to the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, His Excellency Ambassador Aarno Karhilo.

Mr. KARHILO (Finland): Mr. President, allow me to begin by expressing my great satisfaction at seeing you presiding at the Conference on Disarmament and being at the same time the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I wish you all success in both of these important functions.

The Persian Gulf war proved that the international community is capable of acting resolutely and successfully through the United Nations. The independence of Kuwait has been restored. The restoration of stability and security in the area is now under way. The unique task of the United Nations Special Commission established under Security Council resolution 687 is part of that effort. The work of the Special Commission has specific relevance to the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the chemical weapons negotiations.

The Gulf war has clearly shown that military disparities nurtured by an uncontrolled arms trade as well as potential capacity for weapons of mass destruction are a source of instability and insecurity. It is our firm belief that disparities can be removed successfully only by reductions in the levels of armament. It cannot be done through an arms build-up. We hope that the wider conclusions drawn from the outcome of the Gulf war are conducive to the removal of military disparities at the regional level through realistically structured multilateral negotiations. These could cover, inter alia, regional disarmament and confidence-building measures, arms transfers and the question of capacities for weapons of mass destruction. The existing network of multilateral disarmament agreements is being tested as a result of the war. In this connection Finland, like some other countries, would have liked to test the applicability of the ENMOD Convention to the environmental damage caused in Kuwait. However, we understand that it is up to the States most directly concerned to decide whether they see any merit in evoking the mechanisms of that particular convention. In principle, Finland maintains that dormant disarmament agreements are hardly in anybody's interest.

The war in the Persian Gulf emphasized once more the urgent need to complete the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. But the war also profoundly changed the perceptions of the role of chemical weapons and their usability in modern warfare based on high technology.

For a considerable time, the chemical weapons negotiations have been in a dilemma: the text of the draft convention has been refined and improved every year, but the successful conclusion of the negotiations has eluded us. The core issues that remain open are well known. It is also realistic to state that some of those issues remain open only in waiting for the end-game to begin. It should begin now. The statement of President George Bush last Monday should form a good prelude for it. We welcome the readiness of the United States to resolve for its part some important open issues such as the questions regarding a total prohibition of use and an unconditional commitment to destroy all chemical weapons within 10 years of the convention's taking effect. We hope that this new development will accelerate the pace in all issues under negotiation.

The package approach is a helpful illustration of the interrelationship of the issues. However, expectations of a package should not mislead us into assuming that all the pieces of the puzzle can be left to fall in place at one go and at the last minute. The same is true of a ministerial meeting.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

It cannot be expected that the ministers could somehow in a day or two solve the questions that the negotiators have not been able to settle. The task that we can see for a ministerial meeting is to confirm the solution of the main political issues. Thereafter the text could be polished by the negotiators at a rapid pace. Another important aspect of a ministerial meeting is attendance. We are all striving for a universal convention. The signals sent to the international community as a whole have to be carefully considered. One of the main features of the chemical weapons convention will be its non-discriminatory nature. Restricting full participation in an essentially political meeting to anything less than all the countries that have shown interest in the negotiations may result in adverse interpretations of the objective of the whole process.

Confidence-building measures, openness and transparency are proven pace-setters for disarmament measures. They could also serve as pace-setters for the CWC even during the negotiating process. There are measures that have already been suggested and taken in connection with these negotiations - for example, visits to CW-related facilities, declarations concerning the possession or non-possession of chemical weapons, the production of scheduled chemicals and intention to become an original signatory of the convention. Several other possible measures have been identified during the first session of the CD in Working Group A of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. All these voluntary measures are suitable for unilateral, bilateral or multilateral application. Finland would like to see more countries consider making use of them.

It has been disappointing to see that the advances in the solution of the pending political issues have hitherto been limited. Still, we recognize the fact that a good deal of useful work has been done in the other parts of the "rolling text". In particular, I would like to mention the discussion on the streamlining of the verification system for the chemical industry, based on the Swedish proposal contained in document CD/1053. We are confident that on the basis of an integrated approach, a feasible, practical and cost-effective system for verification will emerge. The most important features of such a system, in our opinion, are the enlargement of the number of facilities open to possible inspections and, at the same time, the concentration of verification activities on the facilities which are the most relevant.

The main contribution of Finland to the chemical weapons negotiations is in the technical field. Within the Finnish Research Project on the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, scientific research has been conducted for some 20 years. The results of these research activities have been published in the so-called "blue book" series and presented annually to the CD. This exclusively verification-oriented research activity is no longer as unique in the world at it was only a few years ago. We welcome the fact that an increasing number of countries are involved in this type of research activity.

Serious discussion based on technical research can only speed up the negotiating process. A wider understanding of technical problems connected with verification and the pursuit of adequate solutions to them contribute to confidence both within and among the participating countries. They have to be fully confident that the means to achieve the aims set forth in the process

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

are both practical and feasible. This confidence-building feature was and continues to be, in our opinion, the wider perspective for the work of the Technical Group on Instrumentation and its successor, the Technical Group on Analytical Database and Laboratories.

In 1989 Finland coordinated the first inter-laboratory comparison test, the so-called round-robin test. The results of that test were reported to the CD last summer. A second, similar test was arranged in November-December last year. The results of that second test will be reported to the CD before the end of this year's last session. Fifteen laboratories participated in this second round-robin test; that is, five more than in the first one. On the whole all laboratories regarded the experiment as useful. This is perhaps best shown by the fact that a third test is being prepared for the coming autumn.

Another concrete activity that Finland has been engaged in during the past year is the training programme on verification analysis required by the future convention. This programme is offered to analytical chemists from developing countries which are members of the Group of 21. The third training course is now approaching its conclusion. We have been pleased to see that this programme has been well received by the countries concerned. During this year chemists from Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia will participate in the programme.

It is our intention to continue the programme and to develop it in substance. In the first phase this means adding some verification techniques not presently covered. It also means penetrating deeper into some existing areas of the programme. We would like to thank the Government of Germany for its support for our efforts. This makes it possible for us to add important new features to the programme. In the second phase we are planning a follow-up course for those who have already participated in the basic course. During the next 12 months we hope to be able to improve the capabilities of the project laboratory in such a way that steps towards the follow-up course could be started.

Another issue that I would like to touch upon here is the nuclear test ban. A comprehensive test ban has for many years been a very contentious issue on the disarmament agenda. For several years the issue could not even be discussed in an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament. In the PTBT Amendment Conference last January there was broad agreement that test ban issues should be further pursued in the CD. It has been gratifying to note that the discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee has been profound and has been conducted in a constructive atmosphere. However, it is clear that the basic differences of opinion have not narrowed. This present reality should not be allowed to become an impediment to useful work which aims at important future results.

The verification requirements of a CTB are one suitable topic for discussion. The work of the GSE in the field of seismic verification provides a good technical basis for these discussions. It is satisfying to see that the number of countries participating in the GSE is increasing, although the geographical distribution still remains uneven.

(Mr. Karhilo, Finland)

Seismic monitoring would not be the only necessary method for the verification of a test ban. Supplementary means must be used to detect possible treaty violations. These means include, for example, radioactivity monitoring and satellite monitoring as well as aerial and on-site inspections. These elements of a possible comprehensive verification system could usefully be considered in an appropriate manner in the CD. Document CD/1054 provides valuable material for further discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee. Further useful material for the deliberations can perhaps be found in the verification protocols of the recently ratified threshold test-ban treaties between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The two threshold treaties merit a further comment. They constitute the first steps taken in the area of nuclear testing since the conclusion of the partial test-ban treaty. They are, as such, significant in their own right. The obstacle to their ratification, an adequate verification system, was overcome. Therefore we have reason to believe that the next steps towards further limitations on the number and yield of tests could be taken in the not-too-distant future. A comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a long-term goal. Yet a substantial step towards the further reduction of nuclear arsenals and the prevention of nuclear war is in the making. The START treaty is within reach and will hopefully be finalized soon. By reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union by a third, the treaty would become a concrete demonstration that the role for nuclear weapons is further diminishing and that gradual nuclear disarmament is advancing.

The gradual elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe is in good progress as a result of negotiated reductions as well as unilateral measures. Even short-range nuclear weapons should soon become an object for negotiations. In parallel with developments in the field of nuclear weapons, Europe has made historic progress in conventional disarmament. The CFE Treaty signed last year will establish a new military balance at a substantially lower level of armament. Conventional disparities were the main reason for the increased role of nuclear weapons in Europe. After the elimination of these disparities that role will diminish, illustrating the interrelationship between these two categories of weapons.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his important statement and his words addressed to me. I would now like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States of America, His Excellency Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): We welcome the resumption of this part of the CD session under your presidency and look forward to working with you in conducting our Conference affairs. I am honoured to be the first to take the floor following the very important and comprehensive statements by Minister Schäfer and Under-Secretary Karhilo, both of whom had kind words to say about the recent CW initiative of President Bush, which I now take the floor to present to this body.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

As we open the second part of our 1991 session, it gives me great pleasure to read to you, and to our colleagues, a message to the Conference on Disarmament from the President of the United States. The message is as follows:

> "The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf has brought into play once again the terrible spectre of the use of chemical weapons against innocent populations. It underscores the urgency of ridding the world of these weapons of terror. I believe that the best hope for eliminating the scourge of chemical weapons is the total ban contained in the chemical weapons convention under negotiation in this Conference. The United States is committed to the early, successful completion of this convention and to its effective implementation. To this end, I have announced a number of steps the United States will take to accelerate the negotiations, and have instructed Ambassador Ledogar to implement my decision at this session. I hope this initiative will also spur other nations to commit themselves equally to the critical objectives of the convention, and I urge all nations to join us in achieving an effective chemical weapons ban as soon as possible. I especially call upon the participants in this Conference to exert every effort toward this end and to set themselves the goal of resolving all major outstanding issues by the end of 1991 and of completing the chemical weapons convention within the next 12 months. To achieve this timetable, I urge that the chemical weapons Ad Hoc Committee stay in continuous session in Geneva. I wish you all speedy success."

President Bush's message sets forth the basic approach the United States wishes to take in concluding our work on a chemical weapons ban. He has long maintained that the best hope for eliminating chemical weapons is the total ban which we are presently negotiating in this forum. Given the urgency of ridding the world of these weapons of terror, we cannot afford to continue "business as usual" in our negotiations.

At the beginning of this week, the President announced that the United States is prepared to take a number of innovative steps to strengthen the prospects for successful conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. Permit me to outline these steps for you at this time.

To instil a sense of urgency in the CD's work, the United States proposes that a time frame be established for completion of the negotiations. We propose that the goal be to resolve all major outstanding issues in the negotiations by the end of 1991, and to complete the convention within 12 months.

To help reach these goals, the United States proposes that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons stay in continuous session from now until the convention is completed; negotiations would continue during the previously scheduled breaks in July and in the fall. This will help ensure that no time is lost and no opportunity is wasted. Under our proposal, the United States is prepared to keep me and my delegation in Geneva and to reinforce the delegation as necessary to support this schedule. We call on other nations to share the same commitment.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

To facilitate completion of a chemical weapons ban within a year, the United States has decided to take steps to resolve two key issues that have become obstacles in the negotiations. In taking these steps we hope to demonstrate that the only way to achieve a treaty is through flexibility. We urge others to show similar flexibility. Specifically, the United States will drop its insistence on retaining a right of retaliation with chemical weapons. The United States will formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation in kind, against any State, effective when the convention enters into force. We will also propose a provision for the convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances.

Further, the United States will drop its position that we and certain others must be allowed to keep 2 per cent of our chemical weapons stockpile until all CW-capable States have joined the convention. The United States will unconditionally commit itself to the destruction of all of its chemical weapons stocks and former chemical weapons production facilities within 10 years of the entry into force of the convention. We call upon all States to declare their stocks of chemical weapons and to follow our lead by beginning to destroy their stocks and production facilities. We will propose provisions for the convention that require all parties, unconditionally, to begin the destruction of their chemical weapons stocks and production facilities as soon as the convention enters into force and to complete the elimination within 10 years.

Verification is one of the key unfinished areas of the convention. While substantial progress has been made in developing the verification system for the convention, important issues remain. The United States reaffirms its commitment to a strong and forthright verification régime. We will soon offer additional concrete proposals to address the central issue of challenge inspection.

Another key unresolved issue is how to achieve the broad participation that is essential for an effective ban. We believe, of course, that significant intrinsic benefits will flow to all parties from a total ban on chemical weapons. We also believe there should be tangible benefits for those States that join the convention - and specific penalties for those who do not. Therefore, the United States will propose provisions for the convention that will require parties to refuse to trade in CW-related materials with States that do not become parties within a reasonable period of time after entry into force.

Many States will be required to destroy chemical weapons under the convention. This is a very complex and technically demanding task. To facilitate the worldwide elimination of chemical weapons, the United States will offer practical and effective help to other States to assist in the speedy, safe, and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons, wherever they may be found. We are creating a task force comprised of United States Government and private industry representatives to develop proposals on how the United States can advise and assist States in chemical weapons destruction. We will provide technical destruction assistance to parties that have chemical weapons located on their territory. This could

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

include visits to our destruction facilities, blueprints, and technical advice. As a forum for practical cooperation, we propose the creation of a technical working group on destruction under the aegis of the CD.

The United States reaffirms its position that there should be sanctions against those States that violate the convention and especially severe sanctions against any State that initiates the use of chemical weapons. The United States declares that it will consider violations of the convention, especially the initiation of the use of chemical weapons, as extremely grave breaches of international law and the United States will impose all appropriate sanctions.

Through the process of negotiation, the participants in the CD are endeavouring to ensure that the chemical weapons convention accommodates the concerns and interests of all participants. Compromises are frequently necessary to achieve this accommodation. We believe therefore that the States participating in the negotiations have a responsibility to support the resulting text. The United States formally declares its intention to become an original party to the chemical weapons convention. We call upon all States to commit publicly to becoming original parties. We also call upon all States to declare their chemical weapons stocks, and to forswear the use of CW for any reason when the CWC enters into force.

Until a total ban is effected, the United States believes it is important to prevent chemical weapons from spreading further. To this end the United States is prepared to provide extensive information on our export controls on CW-related materials and technologies - and on our domestic legislation to enforce them - to all other participants in the negotiations. We recommend that all States enact similar controls, thereby curbing the spread of chemical weapons as we all work toward a complete and formal ban.

Completing the convention in the next year will require considerable effort, dedication, and flexibility from all of us. The status quo will not suffice. It will require all of us to work together if we are to achieve our common objective of a global ban on the production, storage and use of chemical weapons. To achieve universal adherence, the United States is ready to do what is necessary to make a chemical weapons convention a reality. We urge others to show flexibility in their positions and to make the same commitment toward accomplishing our common objectives.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement. I think all the members of the Conference listened with great interest to the points contained in it, and particularly the exceptionally important message to the Conference from the President of the United States of America. I should now like to give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden, His Excellency Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): I have listened with great interest to the statements made by the Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany and the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, as well as to my colleague, Ambassador Ledogar. Needless to say, these statements will be carefully studied by my delegation and in my capital.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

I have already had the opportunity to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the responsible task of President of this Conference, and it is a pleasure to note the skill with which you handle the issues before you both in this capacity and in others.

Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia and Ambassador Aung Thant of Myanmar have recently left the Conference. I should like to thank them for the excellent cooperation my delegation has had with them and to wish them well in their future activities. I avail myself of this opportunity to welcome the new head of the delegation of Myanmar, Ambassador U Tin Kyaw Hlaing, and to pledge the cooperation of my delegation with him in our common endeavour.

Today I should like to touch upon one topical matter which my Government considers to be of great importance and to which I devoted a considerable part of my time as President of the Conference in February/March this year, namely the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. I hardly need to recall that this issue has been before the Conference for more than 10 years. It was agreed already in 1979 that the membership of the CD should be reviewed at regular intervals, and a decision in principle on a limited expansion was taken in 1982. In 1983 the CD accepted that the number of members should be expanded by a maximum of four, and in 1986 the Conference agreed that two candidates for membership should be nominated by the Group of 21, one by the Socialist Group and one by the Western Group. However, it has not proved possible to implement this agreement.

It is no use to continue to discuss this matter in the abstract. A concrete proposal should be made. It is, in my view, possible to find a new formula within the framework of the earlier agreement in principle to expand the membership, which at that time implied an expansion up to 44, if we also take into account the fact that there is now a vacancy among the former 40 members of the Conference.

Against this background I should like to propose that the CD be enlarged by four States - one new member each from Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe - and that the vacancy left by the German Democratic Republic, a European country, should be filled by another European country. The number of members would thereby increase to 44.

When it comes to the internal distribution of seats, each region will of course make its decision according to its own criteria. In the case of Europe my delegation is of the opinion that several factors must be taken into account, including the traditional political groups, their quota of already existing representation in the Conference, and the fact that several neutral European countries have been candidates for membership of the CD for many years now. In this context I wish to recall that still only one neutral country is member of the Conference on Disarmament, although the membership has over the years been expanded on several occasions.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

After extensive private consultations and careful consideration, I have thus come to the conclusion that it is necessary to come out with a concrete proposal at this stage. A continued general discussion will, I am afraid, only contribute to further delays. It would, for example, not be conducive to quick progress to await further developments as far as the existence or composition of political groups are concerned. It will in all likelihood take several years before we can see more clearly what the possible new pattern will look like.

The first stage in this process should be to agree on the formula. The second would be the selection of countries, in which the regional and political groups as well as the President (or a representative appointed by the President) would play a crucial role. The third stage, after consensus has been reached in the Conference on Disarmament, would be the endorsement by the General Assembly of the selection of new members, as was the case in the past.

Let me add that I know this proposal has wide support from individual delegations in the Conference. It is my hope that it will prove to be acceptable to all. Further consultations should be held on the exact formulation and context of an agreement, and I hope that such consultations will continue under the authority of the President.

It is of vital importance not to lose the momentum which has now been generated on this issue. My delegation would therefore like to urge that every effort be made to find a solution in the course of this year's session. It is high time. After more than 10 years of deliberations we owe this to the candidate countries - and to ourselves.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me.

We have now come to the end of the list of speakers for today. Consequently, I should like to ask whether anyone wishes to take the floor at this stage. I see no one. I would therefore like to draw your attention now to the traditional question of organization. At my request the secretariat has distributed a provisional timetable of meetings for the coming week. As you can see, on 20 May nothing is scheduled, since that day is an official holiday for the United Nations Office at Geneva and we shall hold no meetings. The week's first activity will be the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which, in accordance with the decision taken at the last informal consultations, will be held on Tuesday 21 May at 10 a.m. To accommodate the wishes of a number of delegations, simultaneous interpretation will be provided during these consultations. As is customary, this timetable is purely indicative and we can change it if necessary. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to the timetable, which is before you as an informal paper.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I also have some information concerning the informal consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. The background paper on consultative arrangements for non-governmental organizations will be placed in delegations' pigeon-holes tomorrow, Friday at 10 a.m.

I have no other business for today. I see no one wishing to speak at the present stage. Consequently, before closing the meeting, I should like to remind you that three to five minutes after the closure of the meeting the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held in a week's time, on Thursday 23 May, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.592
23 May 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 May 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Serguei B. Batsanov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

GE.91-60913/3196B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I declare open the 592nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I have to begin this meeting on a sad note. I am sure that all of us were shocked by the tragic news of the assassination of the former Prime Minister of India, His Excellency Rajiv Gandhi. Mr. Gandhi was an outstanding political figure whose importance was felt not only in his great country but also throughout world politics. His contribution to disarmament is well known. He advanced comprehensive far-reaching proposals both on his own behalf and in his capacity as a member of the group of heads of State and government known as the Six-Nation Initiative. The demise of a statesman of his calibre represents an irreparable loss for India as well as for the international community as a whole. As the representative of the Soviet Union, I should like to stress that the Soviet people were well acquainted with Rajiv Gandhi and highly appreciated him as a major contemporary statesman and political leader, who continued the great national cause of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi and made an unfading contribution to Indian-Soviet friendship. Distinguished delegates, I would like to ask you all to rise and observe a minute of silence.

* * *

On behalf of the Conference on Disarmament and on my own behalf I would like to ask the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Chadha, to convey to his Government and to the family of the deceased our sympathy and deeply felt condolences at this difficult time.

Before we turn to our usual programme of work, I should like to ask whether any of the distinguished delegates would like to take the floor at this juncture. In that case, I wish to inform you of our programme of work for today. First of all, I would like to say that the consultations on the dates for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events have been successfully concluded. Therefore, after the list of speakers is exhausted, I intend to put before the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 15 of the progress report on the thirty-first session of the Ad Hoc Group, as contained in document CD/1065.

I have on my list of speakers for today the distinguished representatives of the Netherlands and Peru. Moreover, I would also like to make a brief statement on behalf of the delegation of the Soviet Union. Now I call on the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): On behalf of the Netherlands delegation, I would like to join the President's expression of sadness and sorrow on the assassination of the former Prime Minister of India, His Excellency Rajiv Gandhi. The untimely death of this great leader and statesman is a tremendous loss not only for India but for the world community as a whole. We in the Netherlands considered Rajiv Gandhi a great friend. I am sure that Ambassador Chadha will transmit our condolences and feelings of solidarity to his Government and to the family of the deceased.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on behalf of the Netherlands delegation on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. We are confident that under your inspiring leadership our expectations of considerable progress will be fulfilled. Indeed, we do aspire that in your concurrent capacity as Chairman of the 1991 Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, you will achieve the long-desired CW convention. Do it, Mr. President. You can be sure of the full support of my delegation.

Today I wish to address three subjects: first, the chemical weapons convention in statu nascendi; second, a nuclear test ban, notably its scope and verification; and third, "track B" of the radiological weapons file, on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. Lastly, I should like to introduce document CD/1064, which contains the text of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in Paris on 19 November 1990.

We are extremely happy that the United States of America last week reconsidered its position on a number of delicate issues concerning the draft chemical weapons convention: the issues of security stocks and the use of chemical weapons in retaliation or otherwise. We know that the American decisions were difficult to take, and we are therefore all the more satisfied and grateful that they were taken. I trust them to provide an important political impulse to engage us in the final phase of the negotiations.

It is indeed now high time for all delegations present here to get our act together. Let us establish a realistic deadline and let us start a major effort within the Conference on Disarmament, in conjunction with interested observers, to finalize the convention before the deadline expires. We must reorganize ourselves somewhat to be able to tackle the major remaining issues. And in order not to lose precious time, it will be necessary to continue our negotiations during the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly. Two major problem areas require much further consideration. These are challenge inspections and the verification of non-production in the chemical industry. Of course, much other nitty-gritty work still needs to be done, but right now it seems important to concentrate on solving the two major verification problems. These are complex matters which are vital to an effective treaty and which touch upon important national security and industrial interests. These will therefore take time to solve. Some other difficult issues, such as the composition of the Executive Council, may be tackled somewhat later.

For handling the major question of verification of non-production in the chemical industry, excellent work has been done in Working Group B. This work should be continued as a matter of high priority. Indeed, a régime is coming into being which has good deterrence features with respect to potential violators of the convention and is at the same time cost-effective. Openness of the chemical industry will create the confidence that all parties are faithfully complying with the treaty.

No formal structure exists as yet to tackle the other major issue - i.e. challenge inspections. For the time being we could leave it to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to organize private and open-ended consultations. Somewhat later in the year we may need a more organized

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

structure to handle this complex matter. Many ideas are floating around, while trial challenge inspections have been carried out and are being organized in order to study particular aspects of such inspections and build up experience. We now reach a stage in which concrete and tested ideas are brought into the discussions which must be translated into treaty language. The time is ripe for a major effort in this field.

Most other matters, the nitty-gritty of the convention, could be handled in the existing working groups. However, clear priorities will have to be established. The extended bureau could play a more active role in steering the work that takes place in the different forums.

At this point in time, it does not seem useful to dwell extensively on the various remaining problems. One particular aspect I would like to mention, however, is the question of amendments. Last year we agreed on two types of amendment procedure, a heavy one and a so-called simplified one. The qualification "simplified" is wrong because it gives a wrong impression: the procedure is not simple at all. For any proposed change under this procedure, one or more qualified majorities must be found among States parties, first in the Executive Council and subsequently, if the decision is still contested, in the Conference of all States parties. Since the procedure is quite difficult, we must not be afraid to submit all the annexes of the convention to this procedure. In the main treaty we already have, or we still shall, put all the major obligations which virtually cannot be changed under the "heavy" amendment procedure. The annexes contain the details which could then be changed if really needed, taking into account relevant experience on the part of the Technical Secretariat and the States parties as well as new technological developments. This would be a logical structure for the convention. By adopting an early decision on this matter, all working groups would then also have guidance how to structure the articles of the convention and their annexes.

Finally, we need not be afraid to leave certain details to the Preparatory Commission and the Technical Secretariat to be worked out under the guidance of the Executive Council. There has been a tendency in the past to stipulate all future procedures in detail. This is not our task: our present task is to work out a treaty in which we all have confidence and which includes all major obligations in detail sufficient for us not to find ourselves confronted with unpleasant surprises once the treaty enters into force. Consequently, parts of the "rolling text" can be transferred to the PrepCom for further consideration and we need not devote too much attention to them any more. The extended bureau could also develop proposals on these matters for submission to the Ad Hoc Committee.

I realize that on the chemical weapons convention I have been raising mainly procedural matters, and in doing so, I omitted an organizational decision which is, as you can understand, somewhat dear to us, i.e. on the establishment of the CW treaty organization. I will not dwell on that now. Let me simply stress that these procedural matters are relevant, if we are to get our job done before the summer session of 1992, before our well-earned annual holiday: that should be the ultimate deadline.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

We have, during this year's CD winter session, witnessed an intensive debate in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. The Netherlands welcomes the resumption of the Committee's work and the active participation of many CD members in that debate. There are many subjects which have to be studied in depth in order to increase the understanding of the problems involved. During this spring session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Committee will focus its attention amongst others on the scope of an eventual test ban as well as on verification issues in relation to such a ban.

Indeed, the single issue of the scope of a test ban is not as simple as it appears to be. It involves the problem of defining what a nuclear test is. The definition of a nuclear test could, for example, take the yield of an explosion as one of its main focal points. When the yield goes down, other factors must, increasingly, also be taken into consideration. Modern technology has increased the range of applications where atoms are split or fused. For example, certain technologies to harness fusion power for energy production use very small contained nuclear explosions. Thus, it is one of the matters we have to study carefully. What also should be avoided, in a future test ban, is a prohibition of nuclear tests which leaves open the option of peaceful nuclear explosions. So-called peaceful nuclear explosions can easily be misused for nuclear weapon tests. On the other hand, a test ban should not become an impediment to peaceful nuclear research or nuclear cooperation. Hence my observation that at very low yields, one will have to look at other factors if we want to determine the parameters for a nuclear test ban.

The verification of a test ban is another tricky issue. A test ban should be a comprehensive one, i.e. a prohibition of nuclear tests as has already been established in the partial test-ban Treaty and a prohibition of underground testing. It is clear that seismic methods alone are not sufficient for the verification of such a comprehensive ban. We will also have to look at subjects like monitoring of radioactivity in the atmosphere and satellite observation, notably for the verification of a test ban above ground or water. There might have to be substantial reliance on national technical means owned by a small number of States.

In my own country we had a brief look at the way the monitoring of atmospheric radioactivity is done. In the Netherlands we have modern networks geared towards monitoring nuclear accidents and other nuclear fall-out. These systems are not very well suited to finding a single atmospheric test. However, we have a rather sensitive high-volume air sampling station which could identify any debris of a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere. Few such stations exist, however, in the world, and most are to be found in the northern hemisphere. Standardization of stations is also a considerable problem. For the verification of the prohibition of nuclear tests under water, we will have to look at other measures, like the application of hydro-acoustic technologies.

Up to now the Conference on Disarmament has made considerable efforts to study ways and means of seismic verification of a prohibition of underground nuclear explosions. Yes, considerable progress has been made, but a lot remains to be done. A preliminary conclusion is that on the basis of

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presently existing worldwide seismic capacities, it should be possible to identify underground explosions down to a yield of 10 to 15 kilotons. However, the costs of a worldwide seismic system will rise sharply if yields lower than 10 kilotons are to be identified. On the basis of present technology it seems not feasible to establish a seismic network which could identify all underground nuclear explosions.

Somewhere a line will have to be drawn, when we try to find our way through the Bermuda Triangle of what is politically desirable, technically feasible and financially viable. A considerable amount of further study in the Ad Hoc Committee is therefore necessary. The Netherlands will contribute actively to this debate and will introduce a paper on aspects of verification of a test ban later this year.

The issue of the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities has been a subject within the CD for a number of years. The maximum one can say is that there appears to be deadlock within the "track B" group of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. The main issue where CD members have found themselves in a stalemate in "track B" concerns the scope of an eventual prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. The Netherlands' first and foremost goal has been that mass destruction, as a result of the release of massive quantities of radioactive substances, must be prevented. For the sake of clarity, therefore, it seemed logical to try to select and identify nuclear installations whose destruction or damage as the result of an attack could lead to the release of massive quantities of radiation. Attacks on those installations were to be formally prohibited in a treaty. That was the rationale for the Netherlands' support of option 1 of scope: that is, a prohibition of attack on certain nuclear facilities.

However, it became clear over the years that no consensus was possible in the CD on the basis of such an approach. Some States were aiming at blanket protection of all their nuclear installations, regardless of the aspect of possible mass destruction. That option raised major opposition from other States which feared that such a sweeping approach could create some sanctuaries which, they felt, were inappropriate in wartime. Some other States considered the potential for mass destruction to be the exclusive criterion. Whereas, in the first option, this criterion also existed and led to the notion of prohibition of attacks on certain nuclear facilities, a different approach emerged. I am thinking especially of the possibility that the principal issue does not concern the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities itself, but whether damage as a result of an attack on a nuclear installation leads to the release of massive quantities of radioactive substances and thus, potentially, to mass destruction. States should have the obligation to prevent the massive release of radioactive substances leading to mass destruction.

The Netherlands has looked at these options again. It is clear, especially in the light of recent developments, that it is extremely difficult to protect certain sites, notably in conditions of war. This issue was also raised some years ago by the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany when he pointed to the problems involved with perimeters

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

around nuclear installations to be protected. It is not only a matter of the risk of abuse of such protected zones, but also that it is difficult to envisage credibly that installations which might well have a crucial impact on the war-fighting capability of a State could be spared from attack through protection by a treaty.

As a general rule the Netherlands believes that in a war-fighting scenario collateral damage and suffering by civilians should be avoided to the maximum possible extent. The issue, therefore, when looking at the options under consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, is to find some common ground between the proviso not to create undue advantages and the necessity to avoid mass destruction. The Netherlands has come to the conclusion that when dealing with the issue of a prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, the emphasis should be on the prevention of mass destruction under any circumstances through the release and dissemination of radioactive substances. This is what should be forbidden in a treaty. Such an approach would also be in line with our policy to strengthen, wherever possible, the humanitarian laws of war. In this connection we regret that so few States have ratified the relevant Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention. More groundwork needs to be done. Perhaps in the future interested CD delegations could look at this aspect when consulting each other on the issue of possible elements relevant to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities as well as procedural ways and means to advance this cause. Possibly it could be raised at the forthcoming International Red Cross Conference in Budapest in the autumn of this year.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), signed at the 1990 Paris summit, is an arms control agreement of truly historic significance for European security. The fact that 22 countries have succeeded in agreeing on reducing conventional weapons to considerably lower and equal levels on both sides is evidence of realism, goodwill and mutual trust. The reduction in conventional forces and the far-reaching verification régime provided for in the Treaty reflect the desire on the part of the 22 contracting parties for a significantly greater degree of political and military stability and cooperation in Europe. The success of the negotiations in Vienna in agreeing on methods of bringing about the destruction of tens of thousands of weapons within a reasonable period of time surely means that a genuine change has taken place in the world. By implementing the Treaty, Europe will be transformed into a monitored security zone with an unprecedented degree of transparency in military affairs, thus increasing predictability and mutual confidence. To quote from the CFE preamble, it remains as important as ever to strive arduously to "replace military confrontation with a new pattern of security relations ... based on peaceful cooperation". A key role in determining how fully we achieve that objective will be played by the manner in which the States parties approach the question of implementation of the Treaty. Timely resolution of the serious data problems that hamper the ratification process will be essential. As depositary State of the historic Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), it gives my delegation great pleasure to introduce document CD/1064.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me and his good wishes. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru, Dr. Calderón.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): First of all allow me to convey to the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha, the very heartfelt condolences of my country on the demise of the great statesman Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. Through you, I would ask him to convey to his Government and his people our sincerest condolences and our solidarity with that noble country which is demonstrating its greatness in this time of trial.

As I am taking the floor for the first time in plenary under your presidency, Sir, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation for the skilful way in which you have been performing your responsible functions - congratulations which also extend to your wise leadership of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with the task of negotiating the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. Secondly, I would like to bid a cordial farewell from my delegation to the distinguished ambassadors Loeis of Indonesia and U Aung Thant of Myanmar, and at the same time to welcome very warmly the new representative of the latter country, Ambassador U Tin Kyaw Hlaing, whom we wish every success.

My delegation listened with great satisfaction to the interesting proposals put forward last Thursday, 16 May, on behalf of his country, by Ambassador Stephen Ledogar. With a commendable step that does it credit, the United States has corrected its position on two issues of the greatest importance, with the result that the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons have now gained renewed impetus, to the extent that this time it seems reasonable to believe that the convention on the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons can be finalized next year. This change in the position of the United States has occurred at the very moment when the international community has become deeply aware that chemical weapons are of little or no military use in guaranteeing the security of the States that possess them. We applaud this long-awaited gesture by the United States and all that remains ahead of us is to use the same intelligence and urgency to deal with the still outstanding issues. We agree with the United States delegation that there is no longer any place for "business as usual".

My delegation considers that the United States has taken a very positive step by dropping its insistence on the "right to retaliation". This new position, which goes far beyond its obligations with regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, offers the advantage, in my view, of excluding "second use" for whatever reason and against any State whatsoever as soon as the Convention comes into effect. And should there be any doubt remaining, it is also proposed to ban the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances.

We also welcome the unconditional commitment made by the United States to abide by the time-limit of 10 years for the destruction of all chemical weapon stocks possessed by the States parties, as well as the facilities for the production of these weapons of mass destruction. The abandonment of the contentious position of maintaining 2 per cent as a safety valve in order

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

to guarantee the universality of the convention could not have been more appropriate, and to do so unconditionally could not have been more significant. My delegation also shares the view that intrinsic benefits should be built into the convention in order to encourage the widest possible accession by States. We are also in favour of including sufficient restrictions and obstacles for those who, after a reasonable period, choose to remain outside the convention. For the same reasons the proposal made to us by the United States for cooperation with the States parties in the destruction of their chemical weapon stocks is highly thought-provoking. This initiative is particularly interesting when applied to the case of States parties that have chemical weapons which were abandoned on their territory.

The distinguished representative of the United States also made a proposal of a procedural nature. In concrete terms, the Ad Hoc Committee would be authorized to remain in continuous session over the next 12 months until negotiations are concluded. In view of the fact that my delegation has always demanded that negotiations be speeded up we very warmly welcome this proposal, on the understanding, of course, that there would be certain breaks to permit consultations with our capitals. We fully support the 12-month work schedule together with the increased effort that will have to be made until the end of this year in order to have the convention practically ready. And in order to clear up any doubts, perhaps it would be advisable to amend the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee to ensure that it reflects the new atmosphere prevailing in the Conference. It is this convergence of opinions on procedural matters that prompts me to contemplate the possibility of examining to what extent it would be desirable to keep the same bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee, under your chairmanship, Ambassador Batsanov, until the negotiations are concluded. The need to preserve proper consistency during the final stages of the negotiations could be one of the reasons; but we could also argue the need to keep the same structure in the organization of the Committee's work. In any event, my delegation is perfectly aware of the fact that this is a matter which requires consensus among the regional groups and, above all, the consent of the group that would be expected to nominate a candidate for the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1992.

On the instructions of my Government I am very pleased to inform this Conference this morning that the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is already taking steps leading in due course to the establishment of a national authority under article VII of the future convention. A multisectoral committee will carry out the preparatory work for this purpose. The Peruvian Government is aware of the great importance for mankind of the convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, and therefore wishes through me to state its intention as of now to become an original signatory of the convention.

In the field of arms regulation and disarmament, verification is an effective mechanism for confidence-building and a guarantee to safeguard existing levels of security. Verification is not a philosophical or moral exercise. Above all it serves to confirm eminently technical facts on the basis of observation, supported as the case may be by the use of high-precision instruments. For this reason verification, like any other human endeavour is not and cannot be 100 per cent exact or certain.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

And actually it does not need to be. It is the product of what might be called "political engineering", a half abstract and half exact science which we diplomats seem to practise compulsively, and which makes it possible to say how far one has to move if one really wants to attain one's objective. In each case there is a ruling principle which will ensure the best possible result through an equation in which political good will, together with the technical and juridical resources available, are applied in the light of the "opportunity cost", that basic principle of economic reasoning which, applied to the current negotiations, will demonstrate that there is a lower cost and a greater benefit if we succeed in identifying the right moment at which the convention should be concluded, thus preventing us from choosing the wrong moment when the marginal cost would in all respects be greater than the benefit obtained.

The convention that we have been negotiating for several years now includes in its present form the outline of a revolutionary system of verification. It is not for nothing that provisions related or linked to verification take up more than 70 per cent of the whole. And this is to be expected. However, there is still a considerable amount of work ahead to finalize it. At present it is not possible to rule out, inter alia, a credible set of complementary sanctions, precisely in order to simplify it and avoid having a system burdened with sophisticated contrivances.

In the view of my delegation the future convention will have two main objectives that will form the basis of the international system of verification. We refer to chemical disarmament, which means the total elimination of chemical weapon stocks and of production facilities for such weapons in all States parties; and the peaceful use of the chemical industry, including prevention of the development of capabilities to produce chemical weapons. The first objective is clear and in addition will have to be achieved within 10 years. As a result I do not foresee any major legal problems in achieving it. The second objective, however, calls for discussion. For a start, there is a tendency to set aside the notion of peaceful uses in favour of "purposes not prohibited by the convention". It appears that this distinction would cause no particular problems. However, there is a risk that this concept could provide a cover for the development of an extensive sector of the chemical industry for military purposes not covered by the prohibitions of the convention. The problem would then be to know to what extent this would be compatible with the precept laid down in the preamble that advances in chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind. The verification system which is being developed provides a systematic and coherent set of provisions directed towards ensuring the fulfilment of obligations with regard to these two objectives. This will certainly need to be refined, particularly with regard to article VI. But what must be highlighted here is its comprehensive nature in which challenge inspections or inspections on request constitute one of the key elements.

In this way I come to the central point of my statement this morning. In accordance with instructions from my Government, I have pleasure in submitting to this Conference a proposal on challenge inspections or inspections on request contained in document CD/1075 (or CD/CW/WP.337), which was circulated this morning by the secretariat in all official languages of the Conference.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

In submitting this proposal, Peru is convinced that it can help promote understanding on this issue. The proposals we are submitting today naturally take into account the comments made by several delegations. We have no doubt that the promising atmosphere in Geneva now with regard to the possibility of the early conclusion of the convention will do much to help resolve this thorny issue. The key point of our proposal is that challenge inspections or inspections on request should be viewed as consisting of two clearly differentiated stages. The first, of a strictly confidential nature and eminently technically oriented, within the competence of the Director-General of the Organization. And the second in which the Executive Council would play a leading role, basically of a political nature, in which inspection teams could be authorized wider access within the scope of the request made. The aim of dividing inspections on request into two stages is based on two guiding principles which, in the view of my delegation, should be unshakeable. The first principle assumes that all States parties act in good faith. In other words, there should be no room for doubting a priori, the intention of the States parties to act correctly in accordance with the commitments undertaken. And, by virtue of the second principle, there can be no discriminatory treatment among States parties. Consequently, both the State making the request and the State that has to accept the visit by the inspection team are on an equal footing until proved otherwise.

In the first stage, the request would be made known to the State in question and the Executive Council within 24 hours. The following day the Director-General would designate an inspection team which would travel immediately to the territory of the requested State to inspect the "relevant facilities" in accordance with the request made. When my delegation refers to "relevant facilities" - I wish to make a digression here - it is thinking of the English word "relevant" in its first meaning given in the second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. At this stage the principles of non-discrimination and good faith would not allow for inspection "anywhere without delay", since that would amount to giving excessive credence to the request and considering the requested State a priori guilty. However, if the inspection team did not succeed in clarifying the doubts or concerns expressed in the inspection request, then the way would be open for a second stage, basically political in nature, where the Executive Council could decide to extend the mandate of the inspection team to enable it to inspect "anywhere without delay", but still within the context of the request made, in order to determine whether or not the convention had been breached. This second stage, which gives greater discretion to the inspection team in the territory of the visited country, would therefore be a measure of last resort, which could be followed by the appropriate sanction should non-compliance be proved. The principles of non-discrimination and good faith should also govern provisions to avoid any abuse of the right to inspections on request. These could include sanctions as a means of discouraging the devaluation of this valuable mechanism through abuse. We cannot imagine that, if this right was repeatedly abused, the perpetrator would be left unpunished in full knowledge of the fact that there would be a cost that would have to be paid by someone.

As I have already pointed out, an international system of verification, being a human invention, would always be limited. In principle, concealed intentions or decisions cannot be detected as long as they do not become a manifestation of a will that has not yet been implemented. Consequently, the

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

reliability of the system will suffer from the weaknesses of what is humanly possible. However, this should not be an obstacle to our finding the highest common denominator and concluding within the proposed 12 months, with legitimate satisfaction, the convention which will ban chemical weapons from this planet for ever.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the distinguished representative of Peru, Dr. Calderón, for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. If at this stage there are no delegations wishing to take the floor, I would like to make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union. I see none, and so I shall now turn to the statement.

The beginning of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament has been marked by an important event. On 16 May the United States delegation officially presented to the Conference on Disarmament new proposals based on the statement made by President Bush on 13 May on the prohibition of chemical weapons. President Bush's message to the Conference on Disarmament contained a commitment on the part of the United States to the early completion of work on the covention on the banning of chemical weapons. This is, of course, in line with the Soviet Union's approach to chemical disarmament. There is every justification for including elimination of the chemical weapons threat among the priority tasks facing the international community. Recent events in the Persian Gulf offered a grim reminder of this. We are deeply convinced that this weapon of mass destruction should have no place on Earth, neither in the West nor in the East, neither in the North nor in the South.

The USSR delegation welcomes the new United States initiatives in the field of banning chemical weapons as a necessary contribution to the process of preparation of a convention in this area. They contain a great potential for progress towards agreement on a number of still outstanding issues. This concerns primarily the United States' declared readiness to assume obligations under the convention to forswear the use of chemical weapons in any circumstances, including retaliation, and to destroy completely all stocks of chemical weapons and production facilities within the first 10 years after the convention enters into force. This makes it possible to believe that we will at last manage to solve two of the most important outstanding issues.

The overwhelming majority of participants in the negotiations, including the Soviet Union, have been firm proponents of the need for the unconditional and absolute prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. This is a major contribution that the convention would make to strengthening international security. Such a ban would have a solid moral component as well. We welcome the new position of the United States on this issue, which opens up the path towards early agreement on one of the fundamental obligations of States under the future convention.

It is no secret that the participants in the negotiations gave a critical reception to the proposals which in one way or another allowed for the possibility that not all chemical weapon stocks would be destroyed. Many saw in them an element of discrimination, an attempt to perpetuate differences in the status of States with respect to chemical weapons and even a justification for acquiring chemical weapons. In spite of the fact that the well-known idea

(The President)

of maintaining 2 per cent of chemical weapon stocks until all CW-capable States become parties to the convention was motivated by the aim of ensuring the universality of the convention, it met with similar criticism. Last year the issue of universality was discussed in detail from various points of view and was recognized as a key issue for the effectiveness of the future convention. Quite a few useful alternative proposals were put forward concerning steps that could be taken as of now to facilitate accession to the convention by as many States as possible. Taking into account all the circumstances at the negotiations, the Soviet Union will of course not object to the removal from the draft convention of any reference to the Soviet-American proposal on ensuring the universality of the convention, which was based on the idea of maintaining 2 per cent of chemical weapon stocks.

The discussion of the issues related to the convention's universality has shown that declarations by States of their intention to become original parties or original signatories of the agreement now being drafted are among the major means of strengthening confidence and improving the atmosphere at the negotiations. The Soviet Union is pleased to note that in the course of today's plenary meeting we have heard further statements to that effect. The Soviet Union, initially unilaterally in 1989, then in 1990 jointly with the United States, and also jointly with the participants in the CSCE process, has officially declared its intention to sign the future convention as an original party. We consider it important that other States should follow these good examples, especially now, when the negotiations are in need of a strong and universal political support. Regional initiatives in support of the convention by relevant States are also useful.

Joining the convention does not imply only obligations, but should be naturally related to the actual benefits which would accrue to parties renouncing chemical weapons under effective international control. In this regard we consider that the inclusion in the convention of the provisions now practically agreed upon on economic cooperation and development is a useful step. The same applies to the provisions on assistance in the event of a CW attack or the threat of such an attack. The convention should encourage States to rely on international assistance, which might be provided through the organization under the convention in the event of the use of chemical weapons, which of course would be a gross violation of international law. The USSR delegation supports the setting up under the organization of a special voluntary fund for international assistance, which might take the form of both means of protection against chemical weapons and means of humanitarian assistance to victims of the use of chemical weapons. As for encouraging States to join the convention, the United States' idea that the parties should refuse to trade in CW-related materials with countries that do not join the convention within a reasonable time after its entry into force is also an interesting one. This is a relatively new issue in the negotiations, and its technical and legal aspects will of course need to be looked into further.

The draft convention already contains general provisions on cooperation among States in the destruction of chemical weapons. The declared readiness of the United States to provide practical technical help to other States in the safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons can be welcomed as a specific means of putting this provision into effect.

(The President)

The Soviet Union has a certain amount of useful experience in examining, together with the United States, issues related to cooperation in the area of destruction. The USSR delegation will be prepared to take part in the exchange of views on the United States proposal that issues of cooperation in the destruction of chemical weapons should be discussed already at the negotiating stage.

The ban on chemical weapons would be made more effective by a mechanism of sanctions against violators. Last year material on this topic was prepared for the first time for inclusion in the draft convention. We support the basic principle of this document, that every violation of the convention should give rise to an adequate reaction on the part of the international community and that measures should be taken to redress situations related to violations of the convention. A role in this area could be played both by bodies within the future organization to be set up under the convention and - where there is a threat to international peace and security - United Nations machinery, in particular the Security Council and measures under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. The idea of collective measures in response to violations of the convention, which would demonstrate the unity of the States parties to it, is also well founded. The United States' declaration in favour of strengthening sanctions against those who violate the convention, particularly where chemical weapons are used, corresponds to our approach and, as we see it, is in keeping with the prevailing views at the negotiations. Here too there is a possibility for resolving another of the issues which have not yet been fully agreed.

The ban on chemical weapons must of course be supported by the most highly effective international control. We expect nothing less from the future convention. In this context we note with satisfaction the United States' declaration of its commitment to a strong and firm verification régime. The time has come for early agreement on mandatory challenge inspections, an important element of verification. The major task here as we see it is to strike a balance between the need to ensure, on the one hand, strict compliance with the convention and confidence among all the parties that it is being complied with and, on the other, protection of sensitive information in areas not related to the purposes of the convention. In the view of the USSR delegation, this goal can be reached through a combination of the principle of mandatory challenge inspections anywhere with the idea of "managed access" advanced by Great Britain and tested in a number of trial inspections. We hope that the promised new United States proposals on inspections of undeclared facilities will be a contribution to the joint efforts of the negotiators.

It is hardly necessary to demonstrate the importance of greater openness, especially in the concluding stage of the negotiations. Appeals on that score are also contained in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. Data exchange should facilitate the elaboration of the convention's provisions, including those dealing with the chemical industry. Some time ago the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany introduced a proposal (CD/828 of 12 April 1988) relating to the format of such an exchange of data on a multilateral basis during the negotiations, which comprises both a statement on the presence or absence of chemical weapons and sections related to facilities to be subject to verification. In keeping with this proposal

(The President)

most European States as well as Australia, Chile and Japan have provided information. We call on all States that have not yet provided data in keeping with the format proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany to do so in the near future.

The Soviet Union supports the idea of intensifying the negotiating process with a view to resolving all the major outstanding problems before the end of 1991. The proposal for a package solution of these problems taking into account the whole range of States' interests is also directed towards the early conclusion of the convention. Also worthy of support is the idea of setting a deadline for completing the preparation of the convention which is acceptable to all participants in the negotiations. A special meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament could provide a strong additional impetus for moving towards final agreement. The usefulness of such a meeting, if thoroughly prepared, appears to be acknowledged by virtually everyone, and we believe we should now move on to the practical organization of this important meeting, so that its results match its original intentions.

The elements are now truly falling into place for a breakthrough towards the final goal - the convention on the complete prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks. The new United States proposals will undoubtedly help to broaden areas of agreement between the negotiators. The Soviet Union is ready to cooperate constructively with all States with a view to the speediest possible advance towards a world free of chemical weapons.

I thank the distinguished delegates for the attention given to the statement I have just read as the leader of the Soviet delegation, and if no one else wishes to speak at this juncture, I should like to turn to the adoption of a few procedural decisions regarding our further work. Are there any speakers at this stage? I see that the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Chadha, is asking for the floor.

Mr. CHADHA (India): Before you go on to the procedural matters, I would like to take the floor very briefly to say how deeply touched my delegation is by the kind sentiments expressed by you, Mr. President, as well as the generous references made by the distinguished representatives of the Netherlands and Peru to the memory of the late Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. It is indeed comforting to know that in the hour of our crisis, we can count on the sympathy and support of friends like you and the members of this Conference.

Rajiv Gandhi was a great son of India. He will be remembered for his outstanding contribution to the building of a strong and progressive nation; for his devotion to democratic values; and for his determination to improve the lot of the common man. He strongly believed that if India is to take its rightful place in the comity of nations, it must keep pace with the rapid changes which are taking place in every sphere of human endeavour. Thus, while he remained firmly rooted in our traditional values and culture, he also repeatedly talked of the need for us to look ahead to the twenty-first century.

(Mr. Chadha, India)

Like his illustrious mother, Indira Gandhi, and grandfather Jawaharlal Nehru, Rajiv Gandhi will perhaps be best remembered for his passionate belief in the establishment of a new and more just international order. He worked assiduously for the attainment of this goal. You were good enough, Mr. President, to recall his contribution to the cause of disarmament, which is the central concern of this body. In the famous action plan presented to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, he put forward a blueprint - in a time-bound framework - to rid this planet of the scourge of nuclear weapons. He joined with five other world leaders in the Six-Nation Initiative on disarmament. The ideas incorporated in both these initiatives remain as valid today as they were then and will, I hope, continue to inspire us in the important task in which we are engaged.

India has faced many crises but the people of India have shown on every occasion that they have the necessary resilience to overcome them and to forge ahead on the path of progress. I am sure that they will not be found wanting on this occasion also.

I shall not fail to transmit to my authorities and to the bereaved family the kind words of sympathy expressed here this morning on your behalf and on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I thank the distinguished Ambassador Chadha for his statement and once again I should like to stress that in the person of Rajiv Gandhi the Indian people and all mankind have lost a great figure. We all feel solidarity with India and the Indian people and we are certain that the great Indian people will find within itself the strength to overcome all the difficulties it encounters in its path. Once again please accept our most sincere condolences.

I would now like to turn to the issue of the progress report of the thirty-first session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. It is contained in document CD/1065. In this connection I put before the Conference for adoption the recommendation contained in paragraph 15 that the next session of this Ad Hoc Group should be convened from 29 July to 9 August this year. I see no objections to the adoption of this recommendation, and therefore I take it that the Conference adopts it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): Allow me now to turn to the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies to be held next week. I understand that the secretariat has circulated an informal paper to this effect, and I should like to remind you that as usual the timetable is indicative and if need be we can change it. On this understanding, if I see no objections I propose that we now adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Russian): I have no further special issues for discussion at today's meeting. As you know, this is the last plenary meeting under my presidency, and hence I should like to say literally a couple of words. I do not intend to make a lengthy statement or to make any wise pronouncements. I simply wish to report to you briefly on the basic aspects of the work of the Conference over the period that has elapsed. I think that our work proceeded normally, in a businesslike spirit. We have succeeded in solving one procedural issue which for some time remained outstanding - the dates for the next session of the Group of Seismic Experts; we have just settled that. In my capacity as President I continued consultations on the issue of the membership of the Conference; here new proposals, new ideas were submitted, but unfortunately I am unable to announce any fundamental progress. I shall just say that to all appearances these consultations will be continued, but no longer by me. The secretariat of the United Nations Office at Geneva was also approached regarding the parking of cars by delegations taking part in the work of the Conference.

Substantial changes for the better in the chemical weapons negotiations have opened up new prospects before the whole of the Conference. I think that bearing this in mind we must take a fresh look at the organization of our work and think how best to adapt it to the changed circumstances. I shall continue consultations on this issue as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and I shall act here in close contact with Ambassador Solesby, who from next week on will be in the place I am occupying now.

In conclusion, I thank you for your active and fruitful cooperation and understanding. I should also like to express my gratitude to the staff of the United Nations secretariat, especially Mr. Komatina and Mr. Berasategui for the - I must say - very courteous attention that they manifested towards the work of the Conference as a whole and towards me personally. I should also like to express my gratitude to other secretariat staff aside from the disarmament staff, and in particular the interpreters and translators, among them the translators in the Russian Section, who gave me valuable support. And finally, with all my heart, I would like to wish every success to my successor in this post, Ambassador Solesby, to congratulate her on taking up her duties next week and to express my confidence that, thanks to her excellent professional and personal qualities, she will successfully guide the work of the Conference and achieve greater success than I managed to achieve.

On this note my concluding statement ends, and before adjourning this plenary meeting I should like to remind you that, as agreed in the timetable for this week, immediately following this plenary meeting, literally in three to five minutes' time, we will be holding an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3. The next official plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 30 May at 10 a.m. And now I intend to adjourn this meeting.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.593
30 May 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 May 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Miss Tessa A.H. Solesby (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

GE.91-61026/0349H

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 593rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

To begin with I would like to make a short statement opening the presidency of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This is a rather special moment for me, the first session in which I fill the post of presidency of the Conference. I am of course very aware that it is an honour which arrives with the passage of time, rather than as a result of any qualities of the incumbent. But despite this, to preside over this Conference, with all it stands for in global disarmament, is a very real honour. My own Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Honourable Douglas Hogg, will be addressing the Conference this time next week. I shall therefore limit my own comments today to primarily technical matters.

My turn in this Chair has come in the middle of our spring session. Thanks to the efficiency of my predecessors, Ambassador Batsanov and those who went before him, the structure of the Conference's work is already well in place. The ad hoc committees on the nuclear test ban, on chemical weapons, on prevention of an arms race in outer space, on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on radiological weapons are all functioning smoothly. Informal plenary discussions on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and on prevention of nuclear war are being held on a regular basis. Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico has been undertaking consultations as Special Coordinator on the comprehensive programme of disarmament and I shall ask him to continue to do that. Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan has already held two open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning and has announced plans for further such meetings. I myself shall continue the practice of my predecessors in holding consultations on proposals for expanding the membership of the Conference. In other words, this Conference is on automatic control and it is left to the pilot to make only small adjustments should any become necessary.

It is a time of particularly high expectations for the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Important developments have recently taken place which hold out the hope of accelerated progress. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has already begun consultations on possible changes to the organization of work in order to respond fully to these new opportunities. I intend to support Ambassador Batsanov in this task in the hope of reaching agreement among us all in the very near future. We are fortunate in having such a dynamic Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I should like to pay a tribute to the leadership he has given during the past month in the presidency of the Conference as a whole. It provided further proof that leadership of our important chemical weapons negotiations is in excellent hands.

I am lucky to be able to rely on the help and cooperation of members of the President's bureau, as well as the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference. My aim will be to do whatever I can to assist progress in all aspects of the Conference agenda. I am at the disposal

(The President)

of any distinguished delegate who may wish to consult. This is an important month for the work of the Conference. I look forward to cooperating with you all in order to ensure we make the most of the opportunities before us.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Senegal and Cuba, and I would now like to give the floor to the representative of Senegal, Ambassador Sene.

Mr. SENE (Senegal) (translated from French): Madam President, allow me first of all to congratulate you very warmly upon your accession to the very important post of President of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is very happy to see you presiding over our work during this crucial phase of this session of the Conference on Disarmament, in which, as you yourself have just said, new and important factors offer us hope that progress will make it possible to speed up our response to certain expectations of the international community. I am convinced that under your leadership the work of the Conference will continue in a positive and constructive spirit. Allow me also to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Batsanov, who skilfully presided over the work of the Conference during the month of May.

In the more than 10 years that this negotiating forum has existed in its present form, the Conference on Disarmament has experienced difficulties thus far in concluding a treaty or an agreement in any of the eight fields with which it deals, and the only negotiations under way relate to the prohibition of chemical weapons, bearing in mind that significant progress is being made in other forums, a fact which is sure to give impetus to the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. This appears all the more paradoxical in that, for the first time since the Second World War, definite optimism seems to prevail as a result of the rapprochement between the two world super-Powers and the end of the certainties of the Cold War. Unfortunately, the end of the East-West confrontation has not resulted in the strengthening of stability and peace in the world as we had hoped, and the tragic example of the Gulf war in the wake of the aggression against Kuwait reminds us that the rest of the world is not free of regional conflicts and strategic imbalances, and Africa in that respect is also a theatre to which we can turn our attention in order to reflect on these facts.

At any rate the question of chemical weapons, which will be the main subject of my statement, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction more generally, the abnormal build-up of conventional weapons in certain regions of the world as well as poverty and hunger, the destruction or degradation of our environment, all these today are subjects of great concern and these issues represent the most serious threats currently facing mankind. As the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament will be judged above all on the basis of its ability and capacity to respond positively to these concerns. As regards the problem of chemical weapons, which will be the subject of my statement, the threat of the use of such weapons during the Gulf war highlighted once again, and in a dramatic manner, the urgent need to conclude a convention completely and totally banning chemical weapons. My country, Senegal, shares the concern of the international community at the delay in concluding the negotiations. The

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

hopes raised by the Paris Conference which was a success on the subject of chemical weapons were clearly very quickly dashed, as was the euphoria prompted by the signing in June 1990 by the United States of America and the Soviet Union of a bilateral agreement on the cessation of the manufacture of chemical weapons and the destruction of the major part of their chemical weapon stockpiles.

The Government of the Republic of Senegal has made an unreserved commitment to a ban which would make chemical weapons illegal and ban their use. International security would be strengthened by a binding multilateral commitment which would guarantee all parties that they will not be threatened by these terrible weapons. The future convention, while protecting civilian chemical industry and encouraging international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemicals, should in the first place provide primarily for the complete destruction of existing arsenals and prohibit the use of these weapons. To do that it will have to be universal and non-discriminatory.

Our negotiations have reached a critical phase in which issues are now approached in a spirit that is more constructive than ever before. Thus we listened very carefully to the statement delivered on 16 May by Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States on the proposals made by President Bush. I should like to take this opportunity to state my delegation's appreciation of this welcome initiative on the part of the United States and its President. This initiative marks very important progress which will very definitely give a beneficial boost to our negotiations. We are certain that this new development will contribute to stepping up our work on all items currently under negotiation. The change that has been noted in the American position has taken place at the very time when it has been proved that chemical weapons are not able to guarantee the security of the States that possess them. We therefore welcome very positively the decision of the United States to drop its insistence on the "right of retaliation". This decision, which goes beyond the obligations set forth in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, offers us the advantage of putting an end to the debate on the need for States to have an adequate chemical weapons stockpile for measures of reprisals. The use of these weapons can therefore no longer be justified by mitigating circumstances. The fact that this proposal includes severe measures to be taken against those who have not, after a reasonable period of time, signed the convention after its entry into force is also a new and positive element which must be taken into account. My delegation, moreover, fully subscribes to the procedural proposal made by the United States that the session should be held without interruption so that the convention can be finalized by the end of this year.

My delegation is particularly optimistic that the convention will be completed very quickly since very interesting proposals have been submitted by a number of delegations. Thus in his statement delivered on 16 May 1991, the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius, whom we have always appreciated for his work and his positive contributions throughout the length of our Conference, submitted a proposal on the expansion of the membership of the Conference. We hope that this proposal will help us

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

to settle this issue, which has been pending for a long time. Another proposal that should earn the Conference's full attention is the proposal presented on 23 May 1991 by the distinguished representative of Peru in the form of a working paper on challenge inspections or inspections on request (CD/CW/WP.337).

Today, the delegation of Senegal is very pleased to note that the vast majority of delegations feel we are approaching the final objective - the prompt conclusion of a universal and non-discriminatory convention on chemical weapons. Under your skilful and devoted guidance, Madam President, we are sure that we fill find positive solutions to the major issues of inspections on request and universal accession to the convention, as well as other equally important outstanding issues such as the protection and decontamination of the environment, particularly during the process of destruction of the major CW arsenals. At the global level the principled proposals of the delegation of Senegal on the nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of nuclear war, including the mandates of the ad hoc committees dealing with these issues, have remained unchanged and are well known to all and reflect the positions that have been upheld by the Group of 21.

In conclusion, let me say that the peoples of the entire world today jointly aspire to rid mankind of weapons of mass destruction. To that end, the conclusion of the negotiations on a convention for the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons in so far as the way is now open is a major undertaking which the international community has entrusted to the Conference on Disarmament. The current evolution of the international situation provides new proof of the importance and urgency of discharging this responsibility without delay. The delegation of Senegal would like to reiterate that the key to the success of our negotiations lies in firm commitment to the fundamental objective of the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons. It goes without saying that this objective includes the unconditional prohibition of the use of these weapons, and their total destruction. We are convinced that we will achieve this objective if all parties to the negotiations uphold this commitment by engaging in serious and pragmatic talks and fully demonstrating their political will. The Conference on Disarmament needs to achieve decisive progress to maintain its prestige as a negotiating forum. This session should be action-oriented so as to achieve concrete results.

In conclusion, let me say that Senegal has set itself the objective of working actively for the rapid conclusion of such a convention on chemical weapons. My delegation will continue as in the past to cooperate with other delegations in a constructive and serious spirit for this purpose, to share the concept of general and monitored disarmament so as to strengthen collective security and peace in the world.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Senegal for his statement and also for the kinds words to myself. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Señora Bauta Solés, who will make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21.

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): My delegation's first words this morning, Madam President, go to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing you take up the responsibility at the head of our Conference. The Cuban delegation will have occasion during your term of office to cooperate closely with you in the pursuit of the objectives you have set forth this morning before this Conference. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to thank the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Batsanov, for the excellent work he performed in the same office during the preceding period.

I have requested the floor today to read out a statement by the Group of 21 on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I shall now read the statement in English.

(continued in English)

"As stated during the plenary meeting of last 31 July, the Group of 21 has always attached great importance to the conclusion of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Consultations carried out at the beginning of the present CD session indicate that, even though consensus is elusive on this matter, the majority of delegations members of the Conference on Disarmament would favour the continuation and conclusion of the work on item 8 of our agenda.

"The trend that would seem to prevail in the Conference on Disarmament when assessing the present international situation indicates that circumstances are considered propitious for progress in disarmament negotiations and the comprehensive programme should not be considered an exception. Moreover, recent statements on the future of the Conference on Disarmament's work would suggest that matters of concern to some delegations already have an adequate context in which to be pursued and enough background work from which to benefit. The guidelines derived from the General Assembly resolutions are adequate for the pursuance of the conclusion of the comprehensive programme of disarmanent, as indicated in General Assembly resolution 45/62 E, which 'requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish, at the beginning of its 1991 session, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament'. I have taken the floor today to reiterate the Group of 21's firm adherence to the above-mentioned request."

(continued in Spanish)

This is the end of the Group of 21's statement.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cuba for her statement and also for the kind words to myself. That concludes the list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Mr. ECKERSLEY (Australia): I would like to make a brief statement on behalf of the Western Group of countries, also on the subject of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

In its last report to the Conference on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament noted in its consensus conclusions that it should "resume work with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when circumstances are more conducive to making progress in this regard". The Western Group of countries believes that circumstances now are not more conducive to making progress on a comprehensive programme of disarmament than they were in 1989. Furthermore, the Western Group considers that the practice adopted by the Conference last year, whereby the comprehensive programme of disarmament was considered at plenary meetings of the Conference on Disarmament, continues to be the most appropriate procedure to follow with regard to the comprehensive programme of disarmament this year.

The distinguished delegate of Cuba in her statement made reference to United Nations General Assembly resolution 45/62 E, and it is true that the issue of the comprehensive programme of disarmament was again considered during the most recent session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Western Group would like to draw the Conference's attention to the several negative votes, and even more abstentions, recorded for resolution 45/62 E. This result was at variance with the high levels of support recorded in earlier years for resolutions on this question, and underlines further that circumstances are not more conducive now to making progress on a comprehensive programme of disarmament than they were in 1989. Indeed, this serves to demonstrate clearly that there is no consensus on this question.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia. Would any other member like to take the floor? It seems not, so perhaps I could move on to other matters. The secretariat has circulated today working paper CD/WP.405, relating to a request from a non-member to participate in our work. I have already been informed by the coordinators that there is no objection to that request, and I therefore suggest that we take it up directly at this plenary meeting. As there is general agreement on the draft decision, there seems to be no need now for an informal meeting, on the understanding that this action does not set a precedent for the future consideration of requests from non-members. May I take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Angola will be informed accordingly.

I wish now to turn to the timetable of meetings to be held during the coming week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. The secretariat has circulated an informal paper containing the timetable which, as usual, is merely indicative and may be changed, if the need arises. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In connection with the timetable, I should like to inform you that at our next plenary meeting on 6 June we will receive the visit of a number of high-level governmental representatives, including one head of government, who will be addressing the Conference on that day. The secretariat is already making arrangements with the delegations concerned in order that our proceedings run smoothly. In particular, it will be necessary to ensure that the sequence of statements, as well as the arrival of the high-level visitors, should proceed without any complications and, if I may say so, one essential element will be that we should start our plenary meeting punctually. May I invite you, therefore, to be here by the time scheduled for the opening of the plenary meeting on that day, and that will be 10 o'clock?

May I now turn to a different subject? I am informed by the secretariat that the list of participants, which was issued earlier in the annual session, is now being updated and will appear shortly, incorporating the changes reported since that time. I should be grateful if those delegations wishing to introduce any further changes to the list would inform the secretariat not later than Tuesday, 4 June at noon, so that the new list might be issued very soon thereafter.

I have no other business for today. Before adjourning this plenary meeting, I wish to recall that, in accordance with our timetable of meetings for this week, the Conference shall hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", immediately after this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 June, at 10 a.m., and promptly please.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.594
6 June 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 June 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Miss Tessa A.H. Solesby (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

GE.91-61123/3251B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 594th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Several distinguished visitors have come to the Conference today to address us at a time of important developments in disarmament, as shown by new initiatives of particular relevance in that field on which I am sure we shall hear more at this plenary meeting. On behalf of the Conference, I welcome all our visitors. I am convinced that their statements will constitute a substantial contribution to our work and to the consideration of the complex issues of disarmament in general.

The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Honourable Douglas Hogg, QC MP, was elected to Parliament in 1979 as the member for Grantham. He has held parliamentary positions of responsibility, having been appointed an Assistant Government Whip from 1983 to 1984. He has also held high Governmental posts as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office and Minister of State at the Department of Trade and Industry. He was appointed to his present post in November 1990 and since then has been closely following the work of the Conference.

The Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Her Excellency Helga Hernes, is addressing the Conference for the second time. She has a well-known academic background and has published several books on a variety of topics, including, of course, international relations. She is a member of the Governmental Board on Disarmament and Arms Control and of the Defence Commission, and has been appointed twice to her present high position in the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I also wish to welcome the presence among us, once more today, of our esteemed colleague Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin, the representative of her country in the Conference and Member of Parliament, as well as Chairman of the Swedish Disarmament Commission.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, His Excellency Dr. Taro Nakayma, will also be addressing the Conference today. We expect his arrival to coincide approximately with the conclusion of Ambassador Theorin's statement. We shall then have a brief recess, to allow me to receive the Minister in accordance with the practice of this Conference. We shall then resume the plenary meeting and listen to his statement as well as those of the other speakers inscribed today.

I have on my list of speakers today the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, the Honourable Douglas Hogg, the State of Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Her Excellency Helga Hernes, the representative of Sweden, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, His Excellency Dr. Taro Nakayama, as well as the representative of France. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the Minister of State for foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, the Honourable Douglas Hogg.

Mr. HOGG (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): As the United Kingdom has the honour of holding the Presidency of this Conference, it is for me a very particular pleasure to speak here today. As you have said, Madam President, all the work of this Conference has our whole-hearted support but we do attach particular importance to the achievement of a chemical weapons ban - the urgency of which has been impressed on all our minds by the circumstances of the Gulf war. I shall refer to this later in the course of this statement.

Last year we celebrated the end of the cold war - that confrontation between East and West. It must not be replaced by new confrontations, between North and South or between one Southern country and its neighbour: events in the Gulf have changed our perceptions as to what can be achieved by collective and consensual international action: this has a direct relevance to arms control and to the process of disarmament.

The last 12 months have seen the culmination of an unprecedented era in arms control negotitions: the signature of the CFE Treaty; the CSCE summit in Paris; the likely signature of the START treaty in the near future; and the successful implementation of the 1987 INF Treaty. Now that the CFE Treaty has been signed, all the signatories to that Treaty need to look at further ways of improving stability in Europe.

I have of course referred to success in Europe, but that is in stark contrast to the rising threat elsewhere. The Gulf war should have punctured any euphoria which might have been created by the easing of East/West tensions. The military policies of Iraq have highlighted the dangers of proliferation: the proliferation of chemical weapons, the proliferation of biological weapons, the spread of nuclear weapons and of ballistic missiles and the related question of arms transfers and the arms trade. Of course the fundamental answer lies in finding political solutions to the underlying problems but at the same time we must recognize the importance of arms control accords which by creating conditions of greater confidence, help to bring about the necessary long-term political agreements.

Iraq's massive accumulation of arms has focused international attention on the arms trade. But we need to be clear-sighted. Arms sales are not inherently reprehensible, for countries have a right to defend themselves. But suppliers must exercise greater responsibility in the supply of armaments and not just to the Middle East.

The Gulf crisis has demonstrated the need for greater restraint in the supply of conventional weaponry. One element highlighted by the British Prime Minister, John Major, is the need for greater transparency in the global-arms trade. We look forward to receiving the report of the United Nations Secretary-General's expert study group on this issue. We hope their work will provide the basis for a decision at the coming General Assembly to establish a universal United Nations register of arms sales. Such a register has already been endorsed by the 12 members of the European Community

(Mr. Hogg, United Kingdom)

and the United States Government. It would enable the international community to monitor the scale of arms build-up in any one country, for without knowledge, policies of restraint cannot be effective.

We must take all possible measures to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the risks posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and by the ballistic missile systems which can deliver them. Export controls can play an important part in slowing down the rate of proliferation because, if effectively enforced, they can make it more difficult for countries to obtain the equipment and technology with which to develop these weapons.

Some countries are already making efforts to improve and harmonize their national export controls. The Nuclear Suppliers Group met in March to discuss the implementation of its guidelines. The membership of the Missile Technology Control Régime has recently been expanded by the accession of new States parties. The Australia Group is working to increase the effectiveness of its controls on chemical and biological materials. In December last year the United Kingdom held a seminar in London on chemical-weapons-related export controls.

But two important provisos: first we must not jeopardize developing civil, especially chemical industries in the third world; secondly, in supplier countries, industries need to be assured that they can conduct their trade with other countries under fair and equal conditions there.

Of course the most important means available to us to control nuclear proliferation is the non-proliferation Treaty. We warmly welcome the recent announcement by President Mitterrand that France has decided in principle to accede. The accessions of Zambia and Tanzania are also very good news.

With the lessons of the Gulf war in mind, it is important that we should make the most of the opportunity offered by the biological weapons Convention review conference in Geneva this September to strengthen that Convention. The United Kingdom will have a number of proposals to put forward, in particular in the area of confidence-building measures and verification. And we will study carefully ideas from other States parties.

I would like to turn now to the major and wide-ranging contribution to arms control made by the Conference on Disarmament. We believe the issue of nuclear testing remains best handled here in the Conference on Disarmament. That is why we supported the establishment of a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban last year. I reaffirm our adherence to the partial test-ban Treaty, our compliance, though we are not a party, to the threshold test-ban Treaty, and our commitment to a comprehensive test ban as a long-term objective, reached on a step-by-step basis in the context of general and complete disarmament. The United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

(Mr. Hogg, United Kingdom)

The prevention of an arms race in outer space and the banning of radiological weapons are also difficult but very desirable objectives. My Government contributes to the discussions of these subjects, and to the continuing work on negative security assurances, with the hope that realistic and substantive progress can be made.

The area in which the Conference on Disarmament can make the most significant contribution to global arms control at the present time is the negotiation of a chemical weapons convention. The most effective long-term answer to preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons will be the agreement of an effective global ban. The very real threat of the large-scale use of chemical weapons during the Gulf war should now spur us on to complete the task as soon as may be. We support the proposal by President Bush that we should all aim to resolve the major outstanding issues by the end of this year and complete the convention ready for signature by the middle of 1992. We recognize that this is a very ambitious target. However, it is also a very important and valuable one for it would rid the world of a particularly repugnant weapon; it will serve to reaffirm the positive benefits of international cooperation in matters of global security and therefore we will play a full part in the achievement of these objectives.

One of the key issues yet to be resolved in the negotiations for the chemical weapons convention is that of verification. In 1990, my predecessor, William Waldegrave, presented the results of a series of practice challenge inspection exercises we had carried out at government facilities in the United Kingdom. Our main conclusion, one that we commend to all parties, was that there is no site so sensitive that we could not allow some form of access within it. We found that it was possible to reconcile the degree of instrusiveness necessary for effective verification with the protection of necessary legitimate security interests. However we had not, then, included an inspection of a civil chemical site in such practical exercises: here there is a real problem of commercial confidentiality. We therefore decided to carry out such an inspection in order to check whether managed access techniques were applicable and I have the honour today to table a paper, CD/1080, which describes the main lessons from the work we undertook.

We came to the following conclusions: First, that although a breach of the convention would be more difficult to detect at a civil site than at a military site, a wide-ranging inspection would present a significant risk of discovery to an evader. Second, the need to present legitimate commercial confidentiality can be reconciled with the requirements for extensive access. Third, the system of managed access previously developed at sensitive government facilities worked well, with suitable adaptation, in the industrial context. These conclusions have reinforced our view that a system of challenge inspection for both civil and military sites, intrusive enough to represent a real deterrent to evasion, is practical and achievable. Our conclusion remains that effective verification is crucial for the convention and that challenge inspection is the key to effective verification. Without a rapid and intrusive inspection system, the convention would lack the instruments necessary to make it an effective arms control measure.

(Mr. Hogg, United Kingdom)

Although challenge inspection is the key, it is not the only method of verification being developed, and we welcome the new proposals put forward by Sweden for an integrated approach to the routine verification of the chemical industry. We believe these proposals are a step in the direction of a more practical, economic and better-focused régime. Much work still needs to be done on this issue, but the integrated system does offer a positive way forward.

Some other important issues must also be tackled rapidly and imaginatively if a convention is to be ready for signature in 12 months' time. The organization of the convention must be cost-effective and must be funded by a clear and equitable system of contributions. An effective decision-making procedure must be created to oversee its efficient implementation. The benefits of joining, flowing from enhanced security, must outweigh those of staying out - this to encourage wide adherence. A procedure for penalizing States parties in breach of the convention, especially those which use chemical weapons, needs to be developed and parties must act together to prevent non-members from acquiring the means to make chemical weapons.

So, to sum up, we want an effective convention that will not only ban chemical weapons, but deter even the most unscrupulous régime from ignoring that ban in future. Such a convention is now within our grasp. Let us together ensure that we complete it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom for his statement. I now give the floor to the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Her Excellency Helga Hernes.

Mrs. HERNES (Norway); Let me at the outset congratulate you, Madam President, on the assumption of your duties as President of the Conference for this month. It is a particular pleasure for me to see an outstanding representative of the United Kingdom, a friend and a neighbour across the North Sea, presiding over our work.

We are meeting at a time of both promise and uncertainty. The cold war order of confrontation and rivalry lies in ruins. As yet we do not know exactly what is to take its place. At this point the proverbial new European architecture is essentially a fairly rough and incomplete blueprint.

The heady optimism that was typical of the period immediately following last year's CSCE summit has been replaced by a more sober approach. On the whole, that may not be such a bad thing. Visions are important. But they must be tempered with realism. Grand designs are no longer promoted with the same vigour. It is increasingly clear that the construction of a stable new European order of peace will be a slow and painstaking process and that progress will be interspersed with setbacks.

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

The CFE Treaty is of great historic importance. Once ratified and implemented it will contribute decisively to diminishing the military dimension of what used to be the East-West rivalry. It will provide for conventional stability at significantly lower levels of forces. It will largely eliminate capabilities for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations.

The CFE Treaty must clearly be seen as a cornerstone of the new European architecture. It must therefore be implemented faithfully, in keeping with its letter and its spirit. There is a fundamental principle involved here, of course. Treaties freely entered into must be observed. Pacta sunt servanda. Anything less would have a devastating impact on the process of international cooperation.

Against this background my Government notes with relief and satisfaction that the impasse over article III of the Treaty now seems to have been resolved. Removing the last obstacles to ratification and implementation of the Treaty is a major achievement.

It will pave the way for bringing the ongoing CSBM and CFE IA negotiations out of the present impasse. It will also make it possible to indicate preparations in the near future for the next stage of conventional arms control, involving all the 34 participants in the CSCE process. As we see it, a decision to start preparing for the new negotiations could be taken at the upcoming Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers. A mandate should be ready by the end of next year's CSCE follow-up meeting, so that the new negotiations may start immediately following that.

As for the substance of the new negotiations, we could not a priori exclude the possibilities of further cuts in conventional arms. But beyond that a key objective of the next stage of conventional arms control in Europe should be stabilizing measures designed to supplement and underpin reductions. Forces should be restructured in a clearly defensive way. From our point of view it is particularly important to deal effectively with conditions in border areas. Measures should be pursued that would curtail offensive military capabilities and deployments in areas close to neighbouring States.

There is general agreement that the CSCE process must be a key element of the new European architecture. To that end, the process must be strengthened and adapted to the changes that have taken place in Europe. The Paris CSCE summit provided basic guidelines for strengthening the CSCE. The challenge now confronting the 34 CSCE States is that of adding flesh and blood to the skeleton. The basic structures created in Paris must be made capable of functioning effectively and of dealing effectively with the problems Europe is likely to face in the 1990s. Of course these problems will probably stem not so much from military confrontation as from ethnic tensions and conflicts related to minority and nationality issues, as well as from economic and social disparities and environmental hazards.

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

Some highly useful first steps have been taken. From our point of view, however, it is essential that the fledgling CSCE structures be made capable of reacting quickly in case of emerging conflicts or crises. To that end, it is our view that a decision should be taken at the Berlin meeting of the Council to establish an emergency mechanism, making it possible at short notice to convene meetings at sub-political level in situations of emerging conflict or major disruption. Furthermore, it will in our view be necessary to strengthen the CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre by charging it with functions related to the prevention and resolution of conflicts of a political nature, under the guidance and supervision of the Council of Ministers.

The CSCE process has proved successful in reducing tensions and increasing stability in the European context. A broad regional approach such as this could be fruitful in other regions as well. It is, however, a prerequisite that due account be taken of the specific characteristics of each region. We must also remember that it took more than 20 years to arrive at the Paris Charter.

In recent months and weeks we have witnessed developments which should create new opportunities for the multilateral disarmament process. With all its tragic aspects, the war in the Persian Gulf has placed the problems connected to the existence of weapons of mass destruction higher on the international political agenda.

Furthermore, the Gulf war has shown that the United Nations and the international community can act with determination. This opens up new and promising prospects. An important contribution to this process is the Special Commission established in accordance with Security Council resolution 687. Norway is fully committed to the objectives of this resolution and is actively participating in its implementation.

The Gulf war has also dramatically underlined the urgent need to restrain the sale of sophisticated conventional weapons. We feel there is a need for initiating an international dialogue with a view to agreeing on rules for exports of such weapons. The Norwegian Government is in the process of looking into these questions.

In light of this, we very much welcome President Bush's initiative to limit the arms race in the Middle East. The current situation in this region poses unique dangers and opportunities. Halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weapons will require the cooperation of the States in the region, and around the world. Proliferation is a global problem for which a global solution must be found.

President Mitterrand's broad plan for disarmament contains valuable ideas also in this field. His proposal for a meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council to discuss measures of restraint in international arms transfers merits support as the permament members are the leading exporters of conventional arms, and we of course very much welcome the announcement that France is now ready to join the non-proliferation Treaty.

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

Let me also express our support for Prime Minister Major's initiative concerning a United Nations register for arms exports and imports which was elaborated upon in the statement we have just heard from the Minister of State, the Honourable Douglas Hogg.

During the last couple of years many of us have nourished the hope that the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention would soon be brought to a successful conclusion. Successive chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons have spared no effort in trying to reach the final stage of the work of the Conference on Disarmament towards a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons. But despite progress on more technical issues and considerable improvement of the draft text of the convention, this final stage has so far seemed out of reach.

Norway therefore wholeheartedly welcomes President Bush's chemical weapons initiative of 13 May which we hope will bring the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention to an early and successful conclusion. The decision by the United States Government to accept unconditional prohibition of use and total destruction of all its chemical weapons within the first 10 years of the convention is indeed of great importance. We are confident that the negotiations will make full use of the new United States positions to regain the momentum necessary to conclude the convention within a reasonable period of time.

We also support the process of a package approach started by the present chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union, which demonstrates the interrelationship between problems related to security, verification and organizational issues, in our view the most important ones remaining in the negotiations.

We are fully aware, however, that important and complex issues still remain unresolved. The issue of verification of non-production is one such issue. Again, with the necessary flexibility on the part of all parties, progress should be possible on the basis of recent proposals, inter alia by the Swedish delegation. In this context we support the proposal for a ministerial meeting convened at an appropriate time to solve the outstanding political issues. Such a meeting would have to be well prepared and open for participation by countries other than the present 30 members.

Let me also underline the importance attached by my Government to the need for openness and transparency with regard to chemical weapons. All chemical-weapon States should provide information about the location, composition and size of their stocks. Similarly, all countries not in possession of chemical weapons should make declarations to that effect.

Norway will continue her research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This programme was initiated in 1981 and is carried out by experts at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. This year's report is the tenth in the annual series of research publications in this field. A working paper giving a summary of this year's report is being issued

(Mrs. Hernes, Norway)

as document CD/1078, and each delegation will receive a copy of the report itself in the near future.

Within the framework of the present research programme, the Norwegian Government has decided to invite scientists and scholars from developing countries for training in methods of verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. We feel it is important to draw as many countries as possible into this cooperation.

The achievement of a total and permanent ban on all nuclear testing is another important Norwegian disarmament objective. In our view, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is essential in order to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons effectively. The Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for dealing with this issue.

I would like at this juncture to emphasize the concern of my Government about the environmental and health risks associated with nuclear testing. This is an additional reason to discontinue all nuclear tests.

There seems to be general agreement on the goal of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but there are divergent views on how to achieve this goal. In our endeavours towards this end, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban established by the Conference has an essential role to play. We will need to agree on various specific and interrelated issues before a test-ban treaty can be concluded.

I also think we agree that an effective system of verification is a main prerequisite for a successful, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Norway attaches great importance to the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and their GSETT-2 experiment, testing a global network for exchange of seismic data as the most important basis for a future system of verification of a test-ban treaty. Norway is actively participating in this global data exchange experiment by providing data from her seismic array stations through the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR).

As the GSETT-2 experiment is approaching its final stage, we should now give careful thought to the question of how to proceed with the technical aspects of the verification issues. Important tasks still remain for the GSE in preparing for the future treaty as far as seismic verification is concerned. The future activities of the Group could also be extended to other means of verification relevant for a CTB treaty.

Finally, I would like to touch on a question of a different character, but nevertheless of great significance to my Government, namely the question of extension of the membership of the Conference. Norway has been the endorsed candidate of the Western Group since 1986. Yet the decision of the Conference in 1983 to extend the membership of the Conference by no more than four members has not been carried out. We therefore hope that the Conference will be able to take a decision on this issue during this session, thus allowing for Norwegian membership in 1992. We are on our part ready to assume all the responsibilities that full membership entails.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Norway for her important statement and for her kind words. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Madam President, it is a great pleasure for me to see you presiding over our proceedings. My delegation rests assured that the Conference will greatly profit from your effective discharge of this important task, and I am very pleased to see a female President of this Conference. It is another sign of the increasing role of women in an area which has traditionally been dominated by men.

My delegation wishes to express our gratitude to the preceeding President, Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union, for his distinguished contribution to the Conference as its President.

I have listened with great interest to the important statements by the two previous speakers, the Minister of State, the Honourable Douglas Hogg of the United Kingdom and the State Secretary Dr. Helga Hernes of Norway, and I look forward very much to the statements by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Dr. Nakayama, and the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

When I last spoke in the Conference on Disarmament, the air war in the Gulf had just started and overshadowed everything else on the international agenda. The air war in the Gulf lasted for a month and a half; the ground war was over in 100 hours. Still, in this short time more weapons were reportedly used than in the protracted Vietnam war. It may have been the most intense air war in history. It has been estimated that some 250,000 individual weapons were dropped by aircraft - or roughly 6,000 weapons a day - including some 60,000-80,000 cluster bombs, scattering 12-16 million "bomblets".

The war had disastrous effects that will be long-lasting. Large numbers of people were killed - perhaps as many as 200,000 - or wounded, the natural environment was severely damaged and hundreds of oil wells are still on fire, water supplies and other vital social functions still disrupted.

Armed hostilities in the Gulf have come to an end. Yet, we have still to fathom the full implications of this war. We continue to receive new estimates of the human casualties in the war. We continue to be reminded of the social misery and the persecution of minorities in the aftermath of the war. We continue to receive assessments of the physical havoc and environmental damage caused by the war.

What can be learnt from this war? One lesson to be learned from the military build-up in the region, as I said in my statement here in January, is that the international arms trade has to be limited. International control of all arms trade is urgently called for. It must apply to all States, both arms exporters and importers. Another lesson to be learned from the acute menace of chemical warfare is that chemical weapons must be destroyed once and for all and that a total ban on chemical weapons must be concluded urgently.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The central role of the United Nations in the post-war setting is potentially of great significance. This development has given added weight to the overriding objective of the United Nations "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". It may herald a qualitatively new stage in the evolution of norms for international conduct and global peace-building.

There is now widespread agreement that we must intensify the negotiations here in Geneva to completely ban chemical weapons. Who stands to lose by their elimination? Nobody. All countries and all peoples would gain in security if a total ban were achieved. My Government welcomes President Bush's announcement of a shift in United States chemical weapons policy. Acceptance by the United States of both a total ban on the use of chemical weapons and the total and unconditional destruction of existing stocks of chemical arms constitutes a long-awaited breakthrough in the negotiations.

No delegation claims any more that the right of retaliation in kind should be part of a future chemical weapons convention. Throughout the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, the Swedish Government has consistently advocated a total and unconditional prohibition of use, valid under all circumstances. No delegation insists any longer on the option of retaining certain quantities of chemical weapons after the destruction period - a policy my delegation has viewed with profound concern, as have many others.

I am confident that the removal of these well-known obstacles implies a fundamental change in the negotiating process. I am confident that it will contribute to added momentum in the negotiations and the speedy conclusion of the chemical weapons treaty.

Let us be clear, nonetheless, that there is still a heavy workload ahead of us. Essential issues of a highly political character remain unresolved. Verification is one of them. Constructive proposals for the conduct of inspections on request are needed. The crux of the matter is to strike a balance between the legitimate security concerns of States parties and the necessity of having an efficient verification régime which inspires confidence that the convention is being complied with.

As far as the verification of the chemical industry is concerned, constructive work has been carried out in Working Group B of the Ad Hoc Committee. The unified, cost-effective verification régime that has been suggested, which also covers chemical-weapons-capable facilities, seems to contain several elements that could lead to a final settlement. An expanded obligation to declare industrial facilities should be seen as a measure for creating greater confidence among States parties.

In this phase of intensified work and reconciled divergencies, a final settlement of the issues of technological cooperation and of protection and assistance should be within reach. It would be a mistake for any delegation to wait until the very last moment to actively seek a solution of these

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

outstanding issues. Quite the contrary. We should now press ahead. At this promising juncture, an intensification of the work of the Committee is the correct prescription. Without further delay, capitals must supply delegations with instructions flexible enough to permit us to achieve a complete draft treaty text ready for signature within a year.

Chemical weapons were not actually used in the Gulf war. On the other hand, the perceived threat of the use of chemical weapons was real. In order to eliminate the chemical weapons menace, all chemical weapons should be banned and destroyed - everywhere. Sweden strongly supports the United Nations Special Commission set up in accordance with Security Council resolution 687. In this connection, my Government puts special emphasis on paragraph 14 of resolution 687, which states that its implementation represents "steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons".

The establishment of the Special Commission is entirely in line with the central role of the United Nations in safeguarding international peace and security accorded to the world organization in the Charter. My delegation hopes that the practical experience of the Special Commission with the physical destruction of chemical weapons, and the international coordination of this vast undertaking, will have a favourable impact on the negotiations here in Geneva.

The war in the Gulf has also served to remind us that general disarmament efforts must be reinforced by effective non-proliferation measures. In this context, the non-proliferation Treaty, with more than 140 States parties, is the most important disarmament treaty ever signed. Since it entered into force more than 20 years ago, no country has proclaimed itself a nuclear-weapon State. I welcome the decision in principle by France to join the non-proliferation Treaty and urge all other non-parties to do likewise. It is encouraging in this connection to note the reports of an understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the implementation of the agreement to reduce conventional forces in Europe and improve prospects for an agreement on considerable reductions of their strategic nuclear forces in the near future.

A special non-proliferation responsibility rests with countries that have the technologies and know-how for certain civilian products which may also be used for the production of weapons of mass destruction. They must ensure that these products and components are not used or made available for military purposes. Accordingly, the Swedish Parliament recently approved legislation on the export control of products and components which can be used for the production of weapons of mass destruction, for example chemical and biological weapons, as well as missile systems. This legislation will enter into force on 1 July this year. Our legislation is not discriminatory against trading partners with peaceful and civilian purposes only, but it discriminates against those who want to produce or possess weapons of mass destruction. And that, of course, is precisely the purpose of this legislation.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

More than any conflict in the past, the war in the Gulf has highlighted the ramifications of the international trade in conventional arms. Most of the weapons in Iraq's arsenals had been supplied by members of the opposing international coalition and, as a result, in the war they were turned against their very producers and suppliers. The international arms trade has facilitated excessive arms build-ups. At the same time, many nations depend on arms imports to satisfy legitimate defence requirements. International limitation of arms transfers has traditionally been a very sensitive issue, but in the last few years perceptions have shifted - and recently rather markedly. One manifestation of the new trend is the fact that the United Nations is in the process of carrying out a study on international transfers of conventional arms, which is due to be completed this summer. Another indication is the increasing ambition among a number of countries to regulate and limit the international supply of missiles and technologies for certain weapons of mass destruction.

More dramatically, however, the war in the Gulf set in motion processes leading to a recent worldwide surge in attention to this issue. A number of Governments - including some which have voiced considerable scepticism in the past - have expressed their commitment in various forums to the international limitation of arms sales, including here in the Conference on Disarmament. A corresponding interest has also been expressed by both non-governmental organizations and ad hoc groups of statesmen. One case in point is the "Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance", which recently proposed that the monitoring of world arms trade, particularly by the United Nations, should be strengthened with the purpose of eventually agreeing on global norms, regulating and limiting trade in arms, and focusing on both supplier and recipient countries.

All in all, international interest in limiting the arms trade is probably greater now than ever before. This is both a challenge and an opportunity. We should take maximum advantage of this growing new international interest in, and wider acceptance of, limiting arms transfers. An international régime should be set up, therefore, under the auspices of the United Nations to limit and control military trade. In order to be comprehensive and not discriminatory, such an arrangement should be global in scope. In order to be viable, this régime should involve both suppliers and recipients.

Experience shows that efforts to strengthen cooperation may enhance "negative" arrangements, such as control, limitation or prohibition. The ambition to limit military trade should, therefore, be coordinated with simultaneous peace-building, peace-keeping and confidence-building efforts. Regional limitations on military trade and certain weapons and military technologies is not an alternative approach, but a possible complement which may serve to reinforce a worldwide régime. As a topical case in point, we note with interest the United States' Middle East arms control initiative. The objective of the international régime should not be to prohibit, but rather to considerably limit military trade. Such limitations would be a major achievement, and should not undercut the inherent right of any nation to self-defence.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The approach of the international régime should not be discriminatory between different suppliers and recipients. Furthermore, in order to be comprehensive, an international régime should cover not only military goods, but also military services and know-how. It should encompass provisions for an information exchange not only on military trade, but also on military production. Arms-producing and exporting countries should enact effective national legislation to limit and control their respective military exports and production. Effective national control of military production would facilitate governmental control and limitation of military trade. Such national control should not cause problems for producers and exporters complying with applicable rules and regulations.

All States, whether predominantly military exporters or importers, should cooperate with this international régime under the auspices of the United Nations. Such a régime must be supported by appropriate verification provisions and mechanisms. To outline, and reach agreement on, such arrangements is a major undertaking which can be expected to take quite some time to achieve. Yet we do not have to start from scratch. A great deal may be learnt from recent agreements on reducing and destroying conventional and nuclear weapons, and from the experience gained in the negotiations on the verification of a total ban on chemical weapons. In order to be feasible in the short term, a régime should proceed gradually. As a first step, the United Nations should establish a clearing-house for information on military production, exports and imports. All Governments should supply the United Nations with comprehensive statements of their military production, exports and imports. The United Nations should compile and keep a register of these reports, and regularly make this register available to all its Members.

In terms of armed hostilities, the war in the Gulf is over. Nevertheless, the Gulf war continues to present the world community with new challenges. I have sought to outline a threefold challenge, amplified - though not created - by this war: the need for international limitation of the transfer of conventional armaments; the need for a speedy conclusion of a total ban on all chemical weapons; and the need for disarmament, peace and security in Iraq and the entire region.

But peace is more than the absence of war. In building peace, our aspiration must not be limited to saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war. In building peace, we must also - as the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations goes on to say - reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. We must establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained. We must promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for the contribution that she has just made and also for the kind words that she has addressed to me. I would like now to give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): First of all, Madam President, allow me to express the great satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you presiding over our Conference. We all know the distinguished role you have been playing at the head of the United Kingdom delegation, the personal and devoted contribution you are making every day to the cause of disarmament and the authority that has earned you widespread respect. I also wish to convey my congratulations to your predecessor, Mr. Batsanov, on the exemplary way in which he discharged his duties as President of the Conference. I should also like to express my gratitude to the colleagues who at an earlier stage were kind enough to welcome me to this forum, and in turn I should like to convey my greetings to those ambassadors who have just joined us, and all my wishes for success to those who have left us. Finally, I listened most carefully to the statements made by the Minister of State of the United Kingdom, the State Secretary of Norway and the Ambassador of Sweden. I should like to thank them for the comments they made on the recent initiatives taken by my Government.

As you know, on 3 June the President of the French Republic outlined a plan for arms control and disarmament, which my delegation has submitted as an official document of the Conference in document CD/10.79, and which has been circulated by the secretariat. The underlying idea of this plan, which falls within the framework of France's collective thinking with its partners following the war in the Persian Gulf, is that the international situation offers a historic occasion to halt the uncontrolled build-up of arms. France feels a special responsibility which has led it to take a comprehensive initiative in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and the control of arms transfers.

The spread of increasingly costly and destructive weapons systems is exposing the world to growing dangers. Inequalities, injustices and the imbalance of forces are conducive to threats, the arms race, and conflicts of all kinds. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction gives a global dimension to these dangers. The whole world, South and North alike, has a vital interest in halting this race and in checking this dangerous and ruinous proliferation. This concerns us all.

Hence our aims are clear. Chemical weapons must be eliminated. Bacteriological weapons must not be produced. Existing nuclear arsenals must be reduced to the lowest level consistent with the maintenance of deterrence. The non-dissemination of nuclear weapons remains an imperative, whereas the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is justified. The dissemination of ballistic technologies must be strictly controlled in so far as they may be used for aggressive aims. On the other hand, there is no reason to prevent cooperation in space for civilian and scientific purposes.

As regards the so-called conventional weapons, a balance of forces should be maintained, or introduced, everywhere, region by region, while respecting the right of all States to security. Arms exports are consequently to be strictly controlled and so conducted as not to contradict this action. France

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has already made these goals its own, and is prepared to subscribe to any improvement in existing arrangements, to any new international or multilateral commitment based on them. It has already started thinking about this issue with its partners in the European Community.

As the French plan indicates, global arms control and disarmament presupposes action at three levels: the weapons category level, the regional level and the worldwide level. First, at the weapons category level. The international community must give specific treatment to each weapons category, proceeding in stages if necessary. In order to achieve clearly-defined goals binding on all, France, which is constantly concerned to adapt its own regulation, proposes that concrete measures, sector by sector, should soon be taken.

As regards the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons: the entire international community, meeting at the Paris Conference in January 1989, acknowledged the need to complete as soon as possible the convention banning chemical weapons which has been negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament. France proposed convening the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in Geneva at ministerial level to conclude the negotiations before the end of the year. It will spare no effort to reach that objective. It calls on all States to become parties to the convention from the outset.

As regards the prohibition of bacteriological weapons: At the Review Conference of the 1972 BW Convention in September of this year, France will propose the addition of a protocol on verification.

Nuclear disarmament remains an essential goal. France supports the efforts to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the two major Powers. It confirms that it will participate in the process as soon as the conditions it outlined to the United Nations General Assembly have been fulfilled.

At the same time, it is important to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the present five nuclear Powers.

France, which is already applying all of the terms of the non-proliferation Treaty, has in principle taken the decision to sign it and hopes that all States will accede to it.

The Missile Technology Control Régime (MTCR), which allows those now in possession of missile know-how to limit the risks of ballistic proliferation, should only be a stage towards a more general agreement. Such an agreement, geographically more extensive, better controlled and applicable to all, would lay down rules promoting civilian cooperation in space, while removing the dangers of the diversion of technology for developing a military ballistic capability. Here again, the aim would be to arrive at a situation where all States wishing to gain access to space for development purposes would cooperate in a framework guaranteeing security.

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France further recommends the development of outer-space confidence-building measures in the form of a "code of conduct" for civilian and military satellites, as it has already indicated, specifically in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

As regards conventional weapons: Conventional weapons exports must not counteract the search, region by region, for a balance of forces at the lowest possible level consistent with the right of each State to security.

The five permanent members of the Security Council - which happen to be the principal producers of conventional weapons - are to start a round of concertation in Paris in the coming weeks aimed at determining rules of restraint. This concertation could then be broadened on the occasion of the next session of the General Assembly, with a view to establishing an international register of arms sales to be kept by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Particular attention will be given, in the course of these discussions, to sales of conventional weapons in parallel markets.

The members of the European Community have already begun a process of concertation aimed at making proposals on this subject.

After weapons category objectives, I should like to turn to regional objectives. The example of Europe on this point is encouraging. The Europeans have moved on from the cold war to peaceful coexistence, and now to cooperation within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). They have adopted and applied security and confidence-building measures. They have signed the first disarmament agreement concerning conventional weapons, which France is happy to see can at last be ratified. In this regard, the Conference is already familiar with the documents submitted by my delegation (the Charter of Paris and the Declaration of 22 States - CD/1043 and CD/1044), the Austrian delegation (the Vienna Document - CD/1070 and Corr.1) and the delegation of the Netherlands (the CFE Treaty - CD/1064). This experience cannot be transposed as such. But it does show that the arms race is not inevitable, and this approach could in our view serve as an inspiration for other initiatives in other regions.

Hence we call for regional security arrangements based on the following rules:

We are convinced that only when the solution of conflicts is started, can this process get underway and confidence be created.

We favour the adoption by the parties concerned of regional confidence-building and security measures. Information is the prime condition of confidence. Transparency and confidence-building measures, i.e. mutual information on force capabilities and strengths, and on the movements of armed forces, reduce the sense of threat and paves the way for disarmament proper. For that, a framework is needed, which may be a regional organization, and means of inspection in situ and by satellite are needed. France would be willing to disclose information available to it to regional

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agencies responsible for transparency. It would favour the transmission to such regional agencies of the means of observation, in particular those in outer space that may be available to Europe and the United Nations.

We consider that efforts must be made, through regional decisions and through negotiations, to move towards a balance of regional forces. Arms export policies must not run counter to this goal. Once this equilibrium has been attained, its level should progressively be lowered through negotiations providing for means of control.

There is a need for the strict regional application of the category régimes laid down for nuclear, bacteriological and chemical (NBC) weapons as well as ballistic missiles. That is why, at the initiative of France, United Nations Security Council resolution 687 on the cease-fire in the Gulf conflict noted that the specific constraints imposed on Iraq as regards nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missiles, represented steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles, along with a global ban on chemical weapons. That goal should be pursued in other regions of the world.

Lastly, the third aspect is the worldwide aspect. The United Nations is now in a position to fully play the role it was assigned by its Charter. France considers that it is therefore for the Security Council to guarantee and, if necessary, to harmonize these disarmament and non-proliferation policies. The Council must encourage the signature of agreements on particular arms categories, as well as regional and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. From the agreements reached, it would derive general rules and thus exercise a function of worldwide vigilance.

This presupposes that the members of the Security Council and in the first place its permanent members will set the example.

This is the essence of the plan submitted by France. My Government felt it important to place it before the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body entrusted with negotiating disarmament agreements on behalf of the international community, as soon as possible. Several aspects of this plan fall directly under our agenda items and my delegation will provide clarifications on these proposals in due course. Other elements could contribute to our joint consideration of these matters, either within the context of the current agenda or a renewed agenda in the future.

The upheavals that have occurred in international equilibria, be this in East-West relations or those between North and South on our planet, open up new opportunities; they also impose upon us greater obligations - first of all that of preventing war and creating the conditions for a fairer and more secure world. Rest assured, Madame President, that France will not fail in its responsibilities.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for introducing the important initiative by his Government, as well as for the kind words he addressed to me.

As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, we shall now have a brief recess, to allow me to receive His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, who will be with us very shortly. May I invite members to be available in this conference room at 11.40 a.m., so that we can resume the plenary on time?

The meeting was suspended at 11.25 a.m. and resumed at 11.40 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 594th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I take pleasure in welcoming, on behalf of the Conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, His Excellency Dr. Taro Nakayama. The Minister has had a distinguished political career, during which he has held high positions as member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Upper House, where he has served three times for nearly seven years, and as Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office, in addition to a number of other posts of responsibility in the Government. He was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in August 1989 and this is his first visit to the Conference, following that paid by his distinguished predecessor, the late Shintaro Abe, who addressed us in June 1984. Mr. Abe's visit is well remembered and I am sure that of His Excellency Dr. Taro Nakayama will be as well. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, His Excellency Dr. Taro Nakayama.

Mr. NAKAYAMA (Japan) (translated from Japanese): It is a great pleasure for me to have the honour of addressing the Conference on Disarmament, a forum with a distinguished history.

First of all, on behalf of the Japanese Government, I should like to take this opportunity to express my high respect for our President, Ambassador Solesby, under whose excellent leadership, backed up by her brilliance and rich experience, we are meeting here today. I should also like to express my high respect for all the distinguished delegates at this Conference, for their important and painstaking efforts in trying to bring the world closer to the achievement of our disarmament goals.

Attending this Conference, I cannot but help recall the time seven years ago when, in the same month of June, Mr. Shintaro Abe, whom I respect as a senior statesman and diplomat of Japan, attended and addressed this Conference as the first Foreign Minister of Japan to do so.

I have two reasons for mentioning this. First, former Minister Abe, whose untimely decease was regretted by many in Japan, and I used to share a deep understanding and beliefs on various matters related to arms control and disarmament. Having assumed my present post in August 1989, I have been

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directing the conduct of Japan's foreign policy in these years of drastically changing world relationships. I have visited various nations and discussed with many world leaders the problems related to the future direction of mankind. Through such talks I have endeavoured to promote world peace, arms control and disarmament, as a contribution in these fields is one of Japan's basic foreign policy objectives. At the same time, I have become even more convinced of the importance of these objectives. Therefore, it has been my strong desire to have an opportunity to come here and attend this Conference in order to share ideas with you.

The second reason for recalling the visit of former Minister Abe arises from the striking contrast between the world of 1984 and the present. On the one hand, when we look back at the past seven years, the extent of the changes that took place in international relations, which indeed surpassed anybody's imagination, becomes apparent. On the other hand, it becomes clear that peace and disarmament were matters of urgent concern in 1984 as well as today. When we take into account these two aspects, the future direction of arms control and disarmament may become discernible.

With respect to international relations, the year 1984 found itself in the midst of severe tension between East and West, between the United States and the Soviet Union. Reflecting this situation, arms control and disarmament efforts were bound to meet with frustration, despair and grave concerns. Then, as is well known, the latter half of the 1980s witnessed the beginning of a change in East-West relations in part due to changes in the Soviet Union, after the arrival of President Gorbachev on the political stage. The change in East-West relations has been dramatically accelerated in the past year or two by such events as the democratization of East European States and the crumbling of the Berlin Wall that symbolized the "iron curtain", whose fall led to the unification of Germany and the signing of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. The change that took place was truly historic and epoch-making. Furthermore, the Gulf crisis that broke out under such changing international relations has demonstrated how the international community, centred around the United Nations and assisted by the cooperative relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, can successfully and unanimously deal with an aggressor State. This example may herald the beginning of a new era in the international political sphere.

Every transitional period in history is accompanied by the predominant factors of instability, uncertainty and the lack of transparency which arise out of the breakdown of the old framework and the complex interplay of old and new forces. Unfortunately, this common fact seems to be present also at this time of history. In the field of arms control and disarmament, the change in East-West political relations has borne fruit in the form of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. However, it is a fact that in the course of half a year after the signing of the Treaty up to the recent agreement concerning its implementation at the United States-Soviet foreign ministerial meeting, the process for its ratification has been complicated and delayed due to some important issues that had arisen. Similarly, the START negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, after entering into the final stage, are hanging uncertainly with regard to the timing of their conclusion.

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In addition, the experience of the Gulf crisis clearly has demonstrated to all of us the need for urgent and serious arms control and disarmament efforts in two areas. The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles is one such area, although this is an area where efforts have already been made to some extent in the past. The international transfer of conventional arms is another such area, however, where no concrete steps have been taken in the past in spite of repeated discussions on the matter from various angles.

Other serious issues requiring solution have also emerged in connection with the implementation of disarmament measures. For example, what should be done about the question of the transfer of arms from one region to another as a result of disarmament arrangements in the former region? What are the security implications of such a transfer to the latter region? What about the ecological problems resulting from the destruction of chemical weapons?

Thus, we find ourselves in the midst of a transitional period where sweeping changes in international relations are taking place. Achievements in the arms control and disarmament field, facilitated by such changes in international relations, have to be made irreversible and pushed further ahead. Unaccomplished tasks left over from the past should be brought up in order to find solutions in the new context. It is a time when all the persistent and indefatigable efforts on our part are required for that purpose.

Precisely for this reason, I believe that the role of the Conference on Disarmament has become more important than ever before, and that the world's expectations for this forum have risen to new heights.

Here in Geneva, one may recall the fact that the Conference on Disarmament, in contrast to its productive years in the 1960s and 1970s, has failed to produce a single disarmament treaty in recent years. On the other hand, it is also a fact that in these same years an epoch-making endeavour has been made assiduously in order to draw up a chemical weapons prohibition convention. This endeavour is truly epoch-making as the convention is to be equipped with a strict and complex verification régime and the negotiations are in fact approaching the final stage. Now that the cold war, which could have delayed the negotiations, is becoming a thing of the past, the time is ripe for new achievements. The goal must be achievable and should be achieved. If and when we succeed in concluding a multilateral disarmament convention with the active participation of developing States, the accomplishment will have no less significance than the recently concluded bilateral and regional disarmament agreements. This accomplishment would also be a significant instrument in bridging the perception gap between developed and developing nations with regard to the approach and the progress of the disarmament process. In this sense, the Conference on Disarmament is now being challenged to prove its raison d'être.

I should now like to take up the question of weapons of mass destruction, with which the work of the Conference on Disarmament is closely linked. Considering the time and the place, it would be only natural to begin with the problems of chemical weapons, upon which I have already touched.

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More than 60 years have passed since the use of chemical weapons was banned by the Geneva Protocol, and more than 20 years since chemical weapons became a subject of this forum. Precisely when the negotiations to eliminate these inhumane weapons appeared to be approaching the final stage, the Gulf crisis broke out. The threat of the use of these very weapons by Iraq heightened the desire of the international community for the early conclusion of the convention to a level never reached before. It is now imperative to conclude the long-standing negotiations as early as possible, without losing the momentum created by the Gulf crisis. I sincerely hope that all the delegates here will make all-out efforts for this purpose.

In this connection, the latest position of the United States announced by President Bush represented a courageous undertaking aimed at global elimination of chemical weapons. Japan heartily welcomes this initiative.

I am aware that there are some proposals for the Conference on Disarmament to be convened at the ministerial level in order to give political impetus to the negotiations. Basically, I am in agreement with the idea, because this may be the way to achieve a breakthrough in some of the pending important issues and to expedite the negotiations. However, such a ministerial conference would not be able to achieve its expected objectives unless issues requiring political solutions are sufficiently narrowed down and crystallized, paving the way for appropriate political settlements. As for myself, I will be willing to attend such a ministerial conference and do my best, if all the delegates here, who are top disarmament negotiators of the respective nations, prepare the ground with the utmost care and if they ask for such a ministerial-level exercise by consensus.

With regard to this, I should like to make a proposal. Perhaps we should consider convening a meeting in Geneva at the level of high officials from nations' capitals. This may become appropriate at a certain advanced stage of the negotiating efforts. Such a meeting at the level of high officials, possibly before the end of this year, may help in moving the negotiations a step further and help in the planning of a ministerial conference.

Of course, whatever the level of a meeting or a conference may be, it would be difficult or even unrealistic to try to draw up a convention that would be 100 per cent satisfactory to all the States parties. Therefore, in putting forward my proposal I should like to urge all States to demonstrate a spirit of compromise to the maximum extent, fully realizing the ultimate goals of the convention. This would be indispensable for the early conclusion of the negotiations.

In conjunction with the new moves I have just mentioned, which are meant to facilitate breakthroughs in the negotiations, it would be important for the Governments of States parties to the negotiations to seek understanding and cooperation from their nationals concerning this convention. Only in this way can nations ensure the smooth implementation of the convention in their territories, including the effective and reasonable implementation of verification and inspection measures. For this purpose, it would also be

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important for Governments to study and carry out practicability exercises. From this viewpoint, my Government is planning for the second time to carry out a trial inspection of facilities dealing with chemicals to be limited by the convention during the current fiscal year. Through the experience and insight to be acquired in this trial inspection, we should like to make a contribution to the establishment of a reliable verification and inspection system.

I should also like to touch upon the question of the universality of the convention. Unfortunately, there is no panacea that would ensure universal adherence to the convention. Each nation will have to accede to the convention on the basis of its political commitment to eliminate chemical weapons from the surface of the Earth. In this sense, it would be important to prepare a convention that would convince all nations that their security would be enhanced by acceding to it. With respect to those nations which still refuse to accede to the convention, it would be important to continue diplomatic efforts of persuasion and to make them realize the high costs they would have to pay by remaining outside the convention. With all the wisdom we have gathered and will gather, we must come up with a formula that will meet these requirements.

As I have been explaining, Japan is for the early conclusion of the convention, and, as was announced during the last session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, Japan will become one of the original signatory States of the convention. On this occasion, I wish to express the hope that all those States that have not done so will make similar announcements, and that all the States possessing chemical weapons will make announcements admitting the fact. By doing this, we can give the convention firm ground on which to stand and build confidence in the idea of the elimination of chemical weapons.

In this connection, the task of the elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons now being carried out by the United Nations Special Commission, consisting of experts from various nations, of which Japan is one, is indeed a momentous task. It will serve, let us hope, as a valuable experiment upon which the future elimination of chemical weapons under the convention may be modelled. The task of the Special Commission will be full of difficult technical and financial problems, including the question of the prevention of harmful environmental effects. Japan is willing to contribute in an appropriate manner to the carrying out of the task of the Special Commission.

I feel obliged to raise, as the next topic, the issue of nuclear weapons, of which the dangers of proliferation were brought home to our minds afresh during the Gulf crisis. I feel obliged because, as the only nation against which atomic bombs were used, Japan has a serious interest in the non-proliferation and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

As is well known, the non-proliferation Treaty is one of the greatest achievements having come out of this multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Today, in order to strengthen the NPT régime, urgent efforts have to

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be made on two fronts, in promoting accession to the Treaty by non-parties, and in securing full implementation of the treaty obligations. As to the first front, Japan has been making démarches to non-parties over the years, whether they are nuclear-weapon States or not, to accede to the Treaty. In this regard, we welcome and highly regard the decision by France to accede to the NPT in principle, and strongly hope that this will promote early accession by other non-parties to the Treaty. As to the second front, Japan intends to make concrete proposals to IAEA and other appropriate forums to increase the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards system, because the need for its strengthening was one of the lessons learned from the Gulf crisis. At the same time, Japan is strongly urging one of the States that has not yet concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA to do so. Furthermore, in connection with the two-fronts efforts I have just mentioned, Japan adopted and announced a policy in early April to the effect that, in extending official development assistance, the trend in the recipient country of the development and production of weapons of mass destruction and missiles will be taken into account, in order to strengthen efforts to prevent the proliferation of these weapons.

The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, adhered to by more than 140 States, has contributed to the maintenance of peace and stability in the world. In view of the importance of the NPT régime, Japan strongly supports a substantial extension of the treaty beyond 1995. At the same time, recalling the oft cited discrimination between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in this Treaty, such discrimination will have to be abolished gradually through further sincere efforts towards nuclear disarmament on the part of nuclear-weapon States - gradually because it is a fact that the peace and stability of the world today still continue to rely upon deterrence and the balance of military power, including nuclear weapons.

Turning to the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which is one aspect of nuclear disarmament, we may recall the fourth NPT review conference of last year, where arguments were made that there should be a linkage between the realization of a CTB and the extension of the NPT. What has to be taken into consideration is not only the question of a CTB, but the overall progress of nuclear disarmament. In this context, I highly value the full implementation of the INF Treaty, and strongly hope for the early conclusion of the START treaty as well as its further continuation in the new round of talks on United States-Soviet nuclear disarmament. Of equal importance is progress towards the next stage of the United States-Soviet nuclear testing limitation talks. In addition, the three other nuclear-weapon States, aside from the United States and the Soviet Union, may be asked to seriously address the question of nuclear disarmament. Also, I should like to remind the Conference that Foreign Minister Abe proposed in 1984 a step-by-step formula as a way to achieve a CTB. Japan continues to uphold the proposal as the most realistic choice in pursuing a CTB within the framework of overall nuclear disarmament.

In this respect, I should like to pay a high tribute to the resumption of substantive work by the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee that was re-established last July at the Conference on Disarmament after a seven-year interval. Ambassador Donowaki of my country chaired the Ad Hoc Committee

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last year. This year again, I am told, the Committee is engaged in a lively in-depth discussion of the subject under the chairmanship of Ambassador Chadha of India. May I express the hope that, through a dialogue between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, common understanding will be deepened? Based upon such understanding, I hope that concrete and feasible steps will be discussed in order to bring us closer to the final goal of a CTB.

I should also like to say a few words about the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament created for the purpose of establishing a seismic verification system that would supplement a nuclear test ban. Japan, as one of the nations with advanced seismology-related technologies, including seismic detection technology, has been actively participating in, and contributing to, the work of the Group over the years. I have high respect for the work of the Group. This year, the Group is to carry out GSETT-2 - the second large-scale test of the global data exchange system as a critical test in their search for the establishment of an international underground nuclear test detection network. I hope that the test will meet with success. At the same time, may I express the hope that the Conference will give full consideration to possible future tasks to be taken up by the Group of Scientific Experts?

Last week the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues was held in the ancient capital of Japan, Kyoto. The main theme of the Conference was "A post-cold-war and post-Gulf-war international system challenges to multinational disarmament". A number of participants from both abroad and Japan, including cabinet ministers and some of the ambassadors present here, participated in lively discussions. Prime Minister Kaifu personally took the initiative to host the Conference in Japan, attended the Conference and delivered a speech. This was in realization of the renewed importance of such issues as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the international transfer of conventional weapons as a result of the Gulf crisis. In other words, one may say that, as the East-West confrontation relaxes and as regional conflicts become less likely to be regarded as proxy conflicts between East and West, the danger of the outbreak of regional conflicts may be increasing. Under such circumstances, we have been reminded of the importance of the question of how to deal with the proliferation and transfer of weapons. I am confident that the Kyoto Conference will serve as a catalyst in stimulating arms control and disarmament discussions here at the Conference on Disarmament, as well as at the United Nations and other forums.

I should like now to take up the question of the international transfer of conventional arms, which became one of the important themes at the Kyoto Conference. Japan announced in March of this year a package proposal entitled "Japanese near-term responses to the problems in the Middle East". With respect to the issue of the international transfer of conventional weapons, the proposal made clear that, first, Japan would contribute, mainly within the framework of the United Nations, to the activities related to establishing standards and rules, including a reporting system to the United Nations, with a view to enhancing the transparency and openness of arms transfers. Second, Japan made clear its willingness to call on nations exporting conventional

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weapons to consider improving and strengthening their legal and administrative frameworks for voluntary restrictions on exports of such weapons. The former proposal is based upon the realization that, in cases where there is a dangerous accumulation of arms beyond the need for self-defence, enhanced transparency and openness of arms transfers may serve the purpose of an early warning to the international community of a dangerous situation. This may be regarded as an information measure to prevent regional conflicts. Also, this may be a form of confidence-building measure, and in a broader sense one of arms control issues. The latter proposal is based upon the realization that an excessive accumulation of conventional weapons in a certain region, upsetting the military balance and threatening the outbreak of an armed conflict, ought to be prevented by the voluntary restraint of nations mainly on the supply side of arms. They may be regarded as one of the practical measures to prevent regional conflicts within the framework of arms control issues.

As is well known, measures to increase the transparency of arms transfers is a subject currently under study by a group of experts, including one from Japan, in accordance with a United Nations General Assembly resolution introduced by Colombia and other Member States in 1988. The result of their study will be presented in the coming session of the United Nations General Assembly. As was stated in the above-mentioned initiative, and also as was clearly stated by Prime Minister Kaifu at the Kyoto Conference, Japan intends to submit to the United Nations General Assembly, at its next session, a draft resolution that would contribute to establishing standards and rules, including a system of reporting to the United Nations of the international transfer of conventional arms. In this draft resolution the report of the United Nations study group will naturally be taken into account. Furthermore, I understand that this problem was also discussed during the United Nations Disarmament Commission's last session in New York, and that the United Kingdom made a valuable proposal regarding the establishment of a United Nations data registration system on arms transfers. It would be useful for nations sharing the same idea to get together and come up with a joint draft resolution. In addition, Japan will be ready, should the need arise, to contribute in an appropriate manner to the upgrading and expanding of the database system of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs so that the database will be able to cover data on arms transfers as well.

As to the question of the export of conventional weapons, I took it upon myself to raise the issue of self-restraint with the foreign ministers of major arms-exporting countries. Compared with the question of weapons of mass destruction, views of nations are more divergent on the question of the international transfer of conventional weapons. Therefore, it is my belief that the most realistic approach to this question should be to begin with the consideration of the strengthening of the self-restraint mechanism on the part of arms-exporting States.

In this sense, I highly value the Middle East arms control initiative announced last week by President Bush as a courageous attempt to tackle the intricate issue of arms transfers. The initiative calls for the establishment of guidelines for restraint and of a consultation mechanism among the

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five leading arms-exporting countries. Japan wishes to see an early materialization of the initiative by the five States. At the same time, Japan considers it important that in the future other major arms supplier States will also participate in the new restraint system, and that its scope will be expanded globally. Japan, as a nation that has long been strictly controlling arms exports on the basis of what we call the three principles of arms exports, will do its utmost in contributing to international efforts aimed at the achievement of such a goal.

The final point I should like to raise concerning the issue of arms transfers is the importance of solving political confrontations and conflicts in individual regions in question. Needless to say, the conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which is the first treaty in the field of conventional weapons disarmament since the Second World War, became possible only after the sweeping changes in the structure of East-West political confrontation. Nations possess military power and stand against each other as a reflection of political confrontation. The CFE Treaty has eloquently proved that it is possible to decrease military confrontation in proportion to the degree of the solution of political confrontation. That is to say, in order to promote arms control and disarmament measures substantially in any given region, including the issue of international arms transfers, it is indispensable to resolve political confrontation. The resolution reduces to a large extent the incentive for countries importing conventional weapons to acquire arms.

It should be said that the transfer of conventional weapons is closely linked to each country's right to self-defence. Indeed, conventional weapons are already widely spread. Furthermore, there is a trend for the proliferation of manufacturing capabilities of such arms. There is a limit, one has to admit, to what can be done in this field. Therefore, from my experience as a student of medical science, I think it vitally important to apply both symptomatic treatment and eradicative cure in such a case. In other words, we must apply what may be termed symptomatic treatment, such as increasing the transparency of transfers of conventional weapons and exercising self-restraint in arms exports. Together with this, there is a need for diplomatic efforts to solve political issues. The latter may be regarded as the eradicative cure aimed at improving body conditions. Application of both methods must be the only way to deal with the problem. Japan is determined to continue both forms of efforts in cooperation with other countries.

I have just tried to analyse recent developments in the world and describe Japan's position on problems in the field of arms control and disarmament which require urgent action. At present, with the cold war receding the world is entering an important period of establishing a new international order. Having experienced two world wars, the entire world community of the twentieth century is still faced with the great and challenging task of how to build an international order of peace and stability. This new international order should guarantee a free, creative and prosperous society, long dreamt of by mankind. We are still in a period of transition with intermingled light and dark patches. However, we may say that

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we are beginning to hear the steady beating of such an international order. Recalling that the approaching twenty-first century is the first chapter of the new millennium or even of the following millenia for mankind, I tremble with the thought of our great responsibility to our progeny. Recognizing these historic perspectives and responsibility in this place today, should we not continuously and patiently strive to accomplish our noble tasks in arms control and disarmament during the remain precious decade before the turn of the century?

I am determined to continue these efforts in cooperation with you.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan for his important statement and also for the kind words which he addressed to me.

As you know, the Prime Minister of Australia, His Excellency the Honourable Robert J.L. Hawke, AC MP, was inscribed to address the Conference today. Unfortunately, he had to cancel his visit for reasons relating to his high responsibilities. However, the Prime Minister has addressed a message to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, and I would like to invite Ambassador Komatina to read this message.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The message addressed by the Honourable Robert James Lee Hawke, Prime Minister of Australia, reads as follows:

"I write to advise you that I will not be able to visit Geneva to deliver my address to the Conference on Disarmament on 6 June.

"I had been very much looking forward to putting my vision both of the challenge that now lies before the Conference and of the achievements which, I believe, are within its reach. Most importantly, I wanted to urge the members of the Conference to move quickly to conclude a convention that will rid the world of chemical weapons. I regret that I will not now have this opportunity.

"I believe that I have a duty to stay in Australia to oversee a number of matters which must be dealt with after the political events here over the past few days.

"I am sorry that it has become necessary to cancel my visit at this late stage. I apologize for any inconvenience this may cause.

"I wish you well in your important deliberations."

Here ends the message, and I would like to use this opportunity to thank the Prime Minister for his message through the Ambassador of Australia.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for reading out the message of His Excellency the Prime Minister of Australia. May I ask the representative of Australia to transmit to His Excellency the Prime Minister our appreciation for his interest in the work of the Conference?

May I now turn to other matters? The secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. As usual, the timetable is indicative and may be amended, if necessary. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish also to draw your attention to a draft letter to be addressed to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of States non-members which are not participating at present in our work on chemical weapons. As indicated in the draft, that letter will be signed by myself, as President of the Conference, and by Ambassador Batsanov, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I discussed the draft letter at the presidential consultations held yesterday and found that there was agreement to despatch the text as drafted. I have to add that, since then, we have noticed a very small editorial mistake in the first paragraph. Since this was drafted, the number of non-member States participating in our work has happily increased and the number should now read 35 instead of 34, so we will make that change if we may. If I hear no objection, I shall proceed as I have just described.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General will transmit the communication, with a covering note, to the Permanent Representatives accredited to the United Nations Office at Geneva or to those Embassies having jurisdiction over the international organizations which have their headquarters here.

That concludes our business for today. You will recall that, in accordance with the timetable of meetings of the Conference for this week, we should hold today, immediately after this plenary meeting, an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". However, it is clear that time is now becoming rather short, especially since, as you know, there is a luncheon given in honour of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. May I therefore come back to the suggestion I made at the end of the informal meeting last week, namely, that the informal meeting scheduled for today be held next week? We would then take up, on that occasion, agenda item 3, as

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well as the subject originally proposed in the timetable adopted today, i.e. agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". I hope that this arrangement will be acceptable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 13 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.